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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to determine whether
options listing induces additional information acquisition
and processing and hence causes a commensurate reduction in
the information content of annual earnings announcement.
The U-statistic is used to measure the information content
of annual earnings announcements.

The dissertation tests

the options listing effects on four different designs:
all exchange

(NYSE/AMEX)

firms,

versus small exchange firms,

i)

ii) large exchange firms

iii) positive unexpected

earnings firms versus negative unexpected earnings firms,
and iv) all over-the-counter firms.
The research found that, after options listing, the Ustatistic of the exchange firms decreases significantly
during the annual earnings announcement day.

The results

also show significant increase in U-statistic during the
pre-announcement period after option listing,

indicating

that the earnings information may have been impounded into
the securities markets earlier.
In testing the

'size* hypothesis, the results show that

options listing has a moderately stronger impact on small
firms than large firms.

However,

the results do not support

the hypothesis that options listing has a stronger impact on
firms with negative unexpected earnings than firms with
positive unexpected earnings.

ix

Finally, the results show that options listing has a
moderately significant impact on the information content of
annual earnings announcements of the OTC firms.

x

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The accounting research literature which examines the
association between accounting earnings and stock prices
provides convincing evidence that accounting data convey
relevant and timely information.

For example,

Beaver

[1968], Patell and Wolfson [1981], and McNichols and
Manegold [1983] show that Lne stock price variance during
announcement periods is significantly larger than in
nonannouncement periods.

These results are consistent with

the hypothesis that earnings data convey new information to
the market.
Options have been a dynamic segment of the securities
industry since the inception of the Chicago Board of Options
Exchange

(CBOE)

in April 1973 .1

Officer and Trennepohl

Several studies

[1981] and Whiteside,

(e.g.,

Dukes, and

Dunne [1983]) have investigated the effect of options
trading on the underlying stocks' price behavior.
studies have mixed results.
however,

Hanaster and Rendleman

These
[1986],

suggest that options trading may improve market

efficiency.

They argue that options trading affects the way

stock prices adjust to the release of information relevant

'The United
exchanges.
They
(NYSE), American
Exchange (FHL.X) ,

States currently has five options
are the CBOE, New York Stock Exchange
Stock Exchange (AMEX), Philadelphia Stock
and Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE) .
1

to firms valuation.

The purpose of this study is to

investigate whether options listing affects the manner in
which accounting information is disseminated in the
securities markets.

Specifically, the research examines

whether options listing induces additional information
acquisition and processing and hence causes a commensurate
reduction in the information content of annual earnings
announcements.

1.1. Background
In order to investigate whether accounting data convey
relevant and timely information, empirical research has
investigated the association between accounting earnings and
equity security returns.

Studies such as Beaver [1968],

Patell and Wolfson [1981], and McNichols and Manegold [1983]
have found that the stock price revisions during the
earnings announcement period are significantly larger than
during the nonannouncement period.

These results are

consistent with, and therefore support, the hypothesis that
earnings data convey new information to investors.
Research studies also investigate various factors that
affect the information content of earnings announcements.
Briefly,

several studies found significant relationships

between unexpected earnings and unexpected return during the
announcement period (e.g., Beaver [1974], Beaver e t . al.
[1979], Patell [1976], and Joy e t . al [1977]).

Other

3
studies found that the information content of earnings
announcement is inversely related to the amount of
information disclosed in the nonannouncement period (e.g.,
Grant

[1980], and McNichols and Manegold [1983]).

addition,

In

studies generally found that the earnings

announcement of small firms has more information content
than the earnings announcement of large firms (Atiase
[1980], Grant [1980],

Freeman [1987]).

The results of these

studies seem to suggest that sma11 firms are less
informationally efficient than large firms
the

size' effect).

(commonly called

Down and Dyckman [1973] contend that

smaller and less well-known firms have fewer analysts
following their activities.

As a result,

the accounting

reports may represent important information sources for
small firms vis-a-vis large firms.
Information-content studies, especially the

'size'

effect studies, make important contributions not only to the
accounting reasearch but also to the market efficiency
research as well.

The following sections briefly discusss

how options trading may improve informational efficiency and
consequently affect information content of annual earnings
announcements.

1.2

Anomalies to Market Efficiency
Information content and market efficiency research are

closely related because all of the market-based accounting

4
research

(MBAR)

assumptions:

is based on either or both of the following

(1) the capital market is an efficient capital

market (ECM), and/or (2) the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM)

is valid.

For empirical testing purposes,

Fama

[1970]

operationalized the notion of market efficiency into three
categories, which depend on the nature of the information
set of interest.

The categories are the strong form, semi-

strong form, and weak form.

Fama found considerable

evidence to support: the semi-strong form of capital market
efficiency,

at least for NYSE-listed firms.

That is, the

market equilibrium

prices of securities fully reflect all

publicly available

information, such as earnings

announcements,

instantaneously and in an unbiased manner.

Despite the acceptance of the semi-strong form of
market efficiency,

the evidence on market efficiency

unanimous.

last decade, "anomalies" in market

in the

efficiency have been found at an increasing rate.
and perhaps the most puzzling,

is not

First,

is referred to as the "post

earnings announcement drift"; stock prices appear to react
with a lag to earnings announcements
McEnally [1977], Watts
[1979]).

(Joy, Litzenberger, and

[1978], Brown [1978], Joy and Jones

This phenomenon is incompatible with the

instantaneous adjustment property of an informationally
efficient market.

5
Secondly,

Basu [1977] shows that risk-adjusted excess

returns can be earned by purchasing securities whose priceto-earnings

(P/E) ratios are in the lower one-fifth of firms

in a given sample.

Moreover,

some studies have found that

abnorma1 returns accrue as a result of following experts1
recommendations appearing in the financial press:

Wall

Street Journal column "Heard on the Street" and Briloff's
critical articles in Barron's (Davies and Canes [1978], and
Foster [1979]).

Presumably,

expert opinions issued by the

financial press are based on publicly disclosed information.
If the market is efficient,

such information should not have

prompted abnormal profits.
There are many other observed phenomena which cannot be
explained by the efficient market hypothesis as
traditionally propagated.

Some examples are:

(1) stock

prices annually rise in early January ("January effect");
(2) stock prices fall more often than not on Monday; and (3)
the Dow index dropped 508 points in one day on the wellknown Black Monday of 1987.

These unexplained phenomena

suggest that the conventional notion of informational
efficiency needs modification.

The emerging notion of

informational efficiency is a "relative" form of
informational efficiency.

6
l .3 Relative informational Efficiancy
In the midst of this contradictory evidence concerning
an efficient market,

the relative efficiency hypothesis

appears to satisfactorily explain the situation.

The

relative efficiency hypothesis maintains that there exists a
differential efficiency for classes of securities.

In other

words, markets may be more efficient for some types of
f irms.
Grossman and Stiglitz

[1976] demonstrate that stock

prices never fully reflect all of the information possessed
by the informed individuals in a competitive equilibrium.
Information is transmitted from the more-informed to the
less-informed individuals through trading-induced price
changes, which ultimately arrive at the equilibrium price.
In short, the capital markets are not efficient,

as

investors do not have homogenous information or
expectations.

This suggests that firms with more-informed

investors are more responsive to information than are firms
with less-informed investors.
Similarly, Diamond and Verrecchia [1981] contend that
prices do not transmit all information possessed by informed
traders,
beliefs.

and that there is only a partial convergence of
As long as the cost of acquiring and processing

the information is, at the margin,

less than the benefits,

the investors will continue to process more information.

Verrecchia

[1979] argues that the extent to which

prices reflect the true distribution of an information set
may depend substantially upon the number of traders who
actively participate in the market for that security.

For

empirical testing purposes, he suggests that the number of
informed market participants can be approximated by firm
size, trading volume,

number of shares outstanding,

number of shareholders.

or

To encourage the research effort in

the area, Verrechia states that "...there is a definite need
for further research to determine what characteristics of
the market imply a greater (or lesser) degree of efficiency
among securit ies.

In this way we can hope to adapt

accounting information standards to a specific market
requirement"

[1979, p.90],

1.4 Effects of Options Listing on Informational Efficiency
Some researchers suggest that the lisitng of options
may increase informational efficiency.

Ross [1976] contends

that options may improve the allocational efficiency of the
economy.

He maintains that options can make an incomplete

market more complete.

Extending Ross's contention,

Kluger

and Wyatt [1988] argue that informational efficiency might
also be improved in a world with an incomplete market
because information which is signalled to the market through
a single price before options are listed can be signalled
through two separate prices after options are listed.

8
There is some empirical evidence supporting the
position that options trading may enhance information
processing and hence the informational efficiency of the
securities markets.

Manaster and Rendleman

(MR)

[1982]

suggest that options trading may affect the way stock prices
adjust to the release of information relevant to firms
valuation.

MR found evidence supporting the hypothesis that

options prices anticipate the information reflected in stock
prices by a period of up to 24 hours.

This suggests that

options prices reflect the options market's own assessment
of stock values rather than the contemporaneously observed
stock price.

Other studies with similar findings include

Bhattacharva

[1987], Snelling [1986], and Anthony [1988].

Jenning and Starks

(JS)

[1986]

investigates the speed

of stock price adjustment initiated by quarterly earnings
announcements using two samples of firms: one having
exchange-1isted options and another without exchange-listed
options.

JS found that the stock prices of firms without

exchange-listed options take a longer time to adjust to
earnings announcements than do the stock prices of options
listed firms.
1.5

Impact of options Listing on the Information
Content of Earnings Announcements
Diamond and Verrechia

(DV)

[1987] infer that because

the options market places fewer restrictions on establishing
a short position in a security,

listing would enhance the

9
speed of adjustment to private information and particularly
to bad news.

DV suggest that options trading thereby

reduces the average absolute value of (excess)
announcement days.

In other words,

returns on

D V 's model implies that,

ceteris paribus, options listing reduces the information
content of the earnings announcements of firms.2

1.6 Implications for Accounting
The present study makes several contributions to both
the information-content studies and market efficiency areas.
The research provides additional insight into the role of
the options market in the processing of accounting
information; specifically,

it will test whether options

listing induces additional information acquisition and
processing before the annual earnings announcement and hence
reduces the informativeness of annual earnings
announcements.

These findings will facilitate our

understanding of the accounting information dissemination
process in security markets.
Moreover, this study is a response to Verrechia

[1979]

which calls for further research to determine which

l e aver's U statistic is measured as the variance of
price reaction (approximated by square of excess return)
during the announcement period divided by the variance
during the nonannouncement period.
Therefore, if the
absolute value of the (excess) return during the
announcement period is reduced so is Beaver's U statistic.

characteristics of the market imply a greater (or lesser)
degree of efficiency among securities.

The goal is to adapt

accounting information standards to specific market
requirements (see p.8).

This study investigates whether

options listing is one of the characteristics which makes
securities pricing more efficient.
If options listing has an impact on the information
content of the earnings announcements, then failure to
control for the options effect may bias the conclusions of
information-content studies where options listing is an
important variable.

1.8 Overview
The purpose of this study is to empirically test for
the options listing effects on the information content of
annual earnings announcements.

The study will examine the

differential impact of options 1isting on large and small
firms.

Moreover,

the study will also test for differential

impact of options on firms with both positive and negative
unexpected earnings.

CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this research study is to investigate
the impact of options listing cn the information-content of
annual earnings announcements.

Therefore, the literature

review chapter is divided into three sub-sections:
information-content studies,
and

(3) options studies.

(1)

(2) efficient market studies,

A review of the information-

content studies is provided to illustrate how the
information content of earnings announcements are measured.
The efficient market studies,

especially the relative market

efficiency hypothesis, are reviewed in order to establish
the underlying theory of this study.

The purpose of the

third section is to review the studies on options and to
establish how options trading may improve information
processing and therefore affect the information-content of
earnings announcements.

2.1 INFORMATION CONTENT STUDIES
Numerous studies on the relationship between earnings
reports and security price behavior seek to demonstrate that
accounting data convey relevant and timely information.

If

earnings reports convey information which is not already
anticipated by the security markets,

the security price

should change during the announcement period.

Therefore, by

looking at the security price reaction around the earnings
11

12
announcement date, one can infer whether the earnings
announcement contains such information.
Since earnings expectations form the basis of security
value, an unanticipated change in a firm's expected earnings
should be accompanied by a stock price movement.

The

seminal Ball and Rroup [1969] study indicates that positive
earnings forecast errors are accompanied by positive
unsystematic security price returns,
negative earning forecast errors.

and conversely for

However, about eighty-

five percent of the stock-price reaction occurred prior to
the earnings announcements.

The result should not be too

surprising, considering that there are so many channels
which firms can use to directly or indirectly release their
earnings information during the predisclosure period (i.e.,
interim leports, production reports, and Wall Street Journal
releases etc).

Nevertheless,

Ball and Brown study appears

to support the notion that earnings announcements convey
information to investors.
Beaver [1968] uses the U-statistic to measure the
informativeness of earnings announcements.

The U-statistic

is calculated by dividing the return variance during the
announcements period by the return variance during the
nonannouncement period.

Accordingly,

if the price activity

during the announcement period is larger than the
nonannouncement period, the U-statistic will be greater than
1.

The sample used by Beaver had an average U value of

13
1.67, suggesting that security price revisions did occur
during the announcement period.

Beaver's U statistic has

been used in many other studies (e.g., May [1971], Hagerman
[1973], Grant [1980], and McNichols and Manegold [1982]).
The mathematical details of the U-statistic will be
discussed in chapter 3.

Magnitude of Unexpected Earnings
Several studies have expanded on the Ball-Brown study
to incorporate the magnitude of unexpected earnings in
addition to size.

If stock prices react to unexpected

earnings, the reaction should be greater for larger
unexpected earnings and vice versa.
Wright

[1979]

Beaver, Clarke,

found that 2 5 NYSE portfolios,

and

ranked on the

basis of percentage change in unexpected earnings per share,
were highly correlated with the ranking of portfolios on the
basis of the size of residual stock returns.

The results

confirmed that the size of unexpected earnings show high
positive correlation with the size of unexpected returns.
Studies with similar findings include Beaver [1974], Magee
[1975],

Patell

[1976], and Joy, Litzenberger, and McEnally

[1977].

Firms Size/Exchang* Effects
Several studies have found a cross-sectional
difference in price reactions to earnings announcements.
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For example,

studies in general have found that smaller

firms usually have greater price reaction during the
earnings announcement period than do larger firms.

Downs

and Dyckman [1973] contend that smaller and less well-known
firms have fewer analysts following their activities.

As a

result, the accounting reports may represent important
information sources for smaller firms vis-a-vis large firms.
Likewise, Atiase

[1980] argues that the amount of

private predisclosure information production and
dissemination increases with firm size.
have more channels,

Large

(NYSE)

firms

such as the Wall Street Journal, to

disclose their interim sources of information in comparison
to small

(OTC)

firms.

(information-content)

Accordingly,

the amount of surprise

in the earnings announcement should be

comparatively smaller for large firms.

Since there is no

direct measure of predisclosure information,

studies have

used proxies such as firm capitalization or exchange listing
to measure predisclosure information (e.g., Atiase
[19B0;1985]; Grant [1980]).
Grant [1980] compares the information-content of
annual earnings announcements for a sample of OTC firms and
a sample of NYSE firms.
proxy for size.

The exchange listing is used as a

Grant found that during the test period,

the NYSE firms had twice as many interim news items appear
in the Wall Street Journal as the OTC firms did.

This

evidence is consistent with the claim that large firms have
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more predisclosure information releases than do small firms.
Grant found that the average U statistic of 1.28 for the
NYSE firms is significantly lower than the average U
statistic of 2.60 for the OTC firms.

These results support

the contention that the price reaction of small firms during
earnings announcement periods is significantly greater than
for large firms.

Atiase [1985]

'firm capitalization*

found similar results using

rather than 'exchange listing'

as a

proxy for size.
Atiase

[1987] maintains that the two proxies for sizes

(firm capitalization and exchange listing) may have
different implications for information dissemination and
information processing.

To investigate the difference in

the two proxies, Atiase studied both the firm capita1izatiui.
(i.e., size effect)

and the exchange effect together using a

sample containing both American Stock Exchange
firms.

(ASE) and OTC

He found that among the ASE and OTC firms of the

same size, the earnings announcements of ASE firms are less
informative than those of OTC firms.

Atiase concludes that

there was a "pure exchange effect" on top of a "size
effect."

He maintains that "being listed on a security

exchange may give the listed firms greater exposure and is
likely to create more opportunities for private information
acquisition which extend beyond the effect of 'size'" [1987,
p . 169 ] .
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Quarterly Reports
The most apparent change in predislosure information is
the policy implemented by the ASE in 1962 which requires all
of the ASE firms to provide quarterly earnings reports.
McNichols and Manegold [1983]

investigates whether that

policy reduces the informativeness of annual earnings
announcements.

They find that the average return variance

around the annual earnings announcements is significantly
smaller after the advent of quarterly reporting.

This

result confirms the inverse relationship of predisclosure
informat ion and price react ion to earnings announcements.

1.3 summary
The "information-content" research has remained active
for the last two decades.

Its contribution to accounting

theory construction cannot be overstated.

In fact, the

information-content studies have been regarded by some
researchers (see e.g.,

Lev and Ohlson [1982, p.262])

as one

of the most important areas in empirical accounting
research.

Research in this area has provided an ample

amount of evidence to support the notion that accounting
reports provide information to investors; earnings
announcements have information content.

Furthermore,

research also identifies factors which affect the
information content of earnings announcements:
of unexpected earnings,

(2) firm size,

(1) magnitude

(3) predisclosure
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information,

and (4) exchange listing.

These factors,

if

uncontrolled, may confound the results of the informationcontent studies.

2.2 MARKET EFFICIENCY
To support the content ion that options 1isting a f fects
the information content of annual earnings announcements,

it

is necessary to demonstrate that the market is not fully
informationally efficient.
studies,

Thus, the market efficiency

especially the concept of relative informational

efficiency, are here reviewed in order to establish the
underlying theory of this study.
Information content and market efficiency research are
closely related because all of the market-based accounting
research

(MBAR), including "information content" studies,

based on either or both of the following assumptions:

is

the

capital market is an efficient capital market

(ECM), and the

Capita 1 Asset Pricing Model

Lev and Ohlson

(CAPM)

is valid.

[1982] state that:
The ECM assumption justifies the fundamental
premise that the impact of informational events
relevant for security valuation (e.g., earningsdata disclosure or the enactment of a new
regulation) could be inferred from changes in
parameters (e.g., mean, variance) of stock-return
distributions around identifiable dates of
disclosure.
This then makes capital markets the
testing ground for information-content hypothesis.
The second assumption— the validity of the CAPM—
underlies the widely used technique of stockreturn risk adjustment (or the matching by risk of
"treatment" and "control" samples) and the derived
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computation of excess (abnormal)
(1972, p.283]

rates of return.

Fama [1970] suggests that a market is efficient with
respect to some set of information if that set of
information is "fully reflected" in prices.

By definition,

a piece of information is fully reflected in price if it is
impossible to make economic profits

(or excess return) by

trading on that piece of information.
efficient market,

Accordingly, in an

security prices should fully and

instantaneously reflect all available information.
In the case of earnings information,
announced,

once they are

they are known to the participants of the

security market.

If the market is efficient, the stock

price would instantaneously reflect the information
contained in the earnings announcements.
average,

Therefore,

on

the investors can only earn the market risk-

adjusted return from trading on that piece of information.

Threa Forms of Market Efficiency
For empirical testing purposes,

Fama

[1970]

operationalized the notion of market efficiency into three
categories, which depend on the nature of the information
set of interest.

The categories are:

1. Strong-fonn tests.
The tests are concerned with
whether individual investors or groups have
monopolistic access to any information (i.e.,
private information) relevant for price formation.
2. Semi-strong-form tests.

The information subset in
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these tests includes all obviously publicly
available information (e.g., announcement of
annual earnings, stock splits, etc.).
3. Weak-forw tests.
The information subset in these
tests includes only historical prices (e.g., past
security prices, trading volume, etc.).
In his survey of empirical literature,

Fama

[1970]

found cons iderable evidence to «npport the semi-strong form
of capital market efficiency for NYSE-listed firms.

That

is, the market equilibrium prices of securities fully
reflected all publicly available information such as
earnings announcements instantaneously and in an unbiased
manner.

Anomalies in Efficient Market
Despite the acceptance of the semi-strong form of
market efficiency,

the evidence on market efficiency is not

unanimous.

last decade, anomalies in market

In the

efficiency have been found in an increasing rate.

The

first, and perhaps

the most puzzling one is referred to as

the "post earnings

announcement drift"; stock prices appear

to react with a lag to the earnings announcements
Litzenberger,

and McEnally [1977], Watts [1978],

[1978], Joy and Jones

[1979]).

(Joy,
Brown

This phenomenon is

incompatible with the instantaneous adjustment property of
an informationally efficient market.
Second,

studies also show that excess returns can be

earned by trading with a certain class of stocks.

For
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example,

Basu [1977] used a strategy of purchasing

securities whose price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios are in the
lower one-fifth of all firms in a given sample.

He found

that portfolios comprising low P/E-ratio stocks, after
adjustment for risk, could earn excess returns.
Moreover, some studies have found that abnormal returns
can be earned by following experts * recommendations such a s :
Wall Street Journal column "Heard on the Street" or
Briloff's critical articles in Barron1s (Davies and Canes
[1978], and Foster [1979]).

Presumably,

expert opinions

issued by the financial press are based on publicly
disclosed information.

If the market is efficient,

such

information should not have prompted abnormal profits.
There are many other observed phenomena that cannot be
explained by the efficient market hypothesis as
traditionally propagated.

Some examples are:

(1) stock

prices rise in early January ("January effect"); (2) stock
prices fall more often than not on Monday;

(3) the Dow index

dropped 508 points in one day on Black Monday in 1987.
These unexplained phenomena suggest that the conventional
notion of informational efficiency needs modification.
Some researchers even question the existence of an
efficient market in its perfect form.

For example,

Sandretto [1979] suggests that it may not be realistic to
assume an efficient market when the theory underlying the
efficient market is based on a number of unrealistic
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assumptions,

including:

(1 ) perfect markets,

information,

and (3) homogeneous beliefs.

(2 ) costless

For instance,

information is not costless in the real world.
in fact,

Information,

is costly to acquire and to analyze, particularly

for small firms.

Sandretto contends that each of the three

perfect market requirements are violated to some extent,

the

extent to which they are violated is different crosssectionally,

and prices will reflect all available

information only when all the investors are informed.

He

concludes that this may not be economically feasible with
the existing institutional arrangements.
Grossman and Stiglitz

[1976] contend that stock prices

never fully reflect all the information possessed by the
informed individuals in a competitive equilibrium.
Information is transmitted from the more informed to the
less informed individuals through trading-induced price
changes, which ultimately arrive at the equilibrium price.
In short, the capital markets are not efficient,

as

investors do not have homogenous information or
expectations.
Similarly,

Diamond and Verrecchia [1981] contend that

prices do not transmit all information possessed by informed
traders,
beliefs.

and that there is only a partial convergence in
As long as the cost of acquiring and processing

the information at the margin is less than the benefits, the
investors will continue to process more information.
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R » X « t l v Informational Efficiency
In the midst of all the contradictory evidence
concerning an efficiency market, the relative efficiency
hypothesis appears to satisfactorily explain the situation.
The relative efficiency hypothesis maintains that there
exists a differential efficiency for classes of securities.
In other words, markets may be more efficient for some types
of firms.

Eandretto [1979J argues that "it may be that for

large firms, there are a larger number of informed investors
and a highly efficient market.

In contrast,

smaller firms

may have fewer informed investors and their market may be
less efficient"

[1979, pp.26-27].

Verrecchia [1979] argues that the extent to which
prices reflect the true distribution of an information set
may depend substantially upon the number of traders who
actively participate in the market for that security.
empirical testing purposes,

For

he suggests that the number of

informed market participants can be approximated by firm
size, trading volume,
of shareholders.

number of share outstanding,

or number

To encourage research in this area,

Verrecchia states that "... there is a definite need for
further research to determine what characteristics of the
market imply a greater
among securities.

(or lesser) degree of efficiency

In this way we can hope to uaapt
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accounting information standards to a specific market
requirement."

[1979, p. 90]

summary

Despite the acceptance of the semi-strong form of
market efficiency,

the evidence concerning market efficiency

is not unanimous.

Anomalies which are inconsistent with

market efficiency are being found at an increasing rate.

In

the midst of all the contradictory evidence on market
efficiency,

the relative efficiency hypothesis is emerging,

stating that there may exist a differential market
efficiency for different firms.

This hypothesis appears to

be consistent with observed phenomena. However,
test of the theory is empirical evidence.

the real

Options trading

provides such an opportunity to test the relative efficiency
hypothesis empirically.

2.3 OPTIONS STUDIES
S ince the incept ion of the CBOE in 197 3, opt ions
trading has grown significantly.
[1985]

Cox and Rubinstein (CR)

attribute the growth of options trading to their

desirable properties.

For instance,

there is no up-tick

rule governing short sales of options, as there is with
stocks.

The up-tick rule prohibits the shortselling of

stock when the price is falling.

An investor with adverse

private information is prohibited from short-selling the
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stock with declining price

(down-tick) but can short its

equivalent in the options market instead.

The second

desirable aspect is related to the margin requirements.
Current regulations limit the amount of borrowing that can
be done using stock as collateral to 50 percent.

There is

no margin requirement for options trading.

investors

Thus,

possessing private information can get a much higher rateof-return by trading in the options market than in the stock
market.
Third, options have lower transaction costs than
stocks.

CR contend that transaction costs can be reduced by

investing in options to establish a position which is held
for a short period of time and requires frequent switching
between stock and bonds.

This uniqueness,

according to CR

[1985, p . 54] may partially explain why short-term listed
options are more popular than long-term listed options .3

Options and Market Efficiency
Options trading has created additional trading
activities within the securities markets.
activities,

Because of these

some researchers suggest that options may make

the market more efficient.

Ross [1976] contends that

options may improve the allocational efficiency of the

3Cox and Rubinstein [1985] also discuss many other
desirable aspects of options (see p.47-59).
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economy.

He shows that options can make an incomplete

market more complete.
and Wyatt

Extending Ross's contention,

Kluger

[1988] argue that information efficiency might

also be improved because information which is signalled to
the market through a single price before options are listed
can also be signalled through two separate prices after
options are listed.
Studies also show that options trading may improve the
speed of price adjustment to publicly available information.
For example, Jennings and Starks (JS)

[1986]

investigate the

stock price adjustment process initiated by quarterly
earnings announcements with two samples of firms: one having
exchange-listed options and another lacking exchange-listed
options.

JS find that the stock prices of non-options firms

take a longer time to adjust to the earnings announcement
than the stock prices of options firms.

Thus, JS contend

that the existence of options markets is useful in
disseminating information (i.e., the market becomes more
efficient).

But the JS study has been criticized by

Woodruff and Senchack [1988]

for not controlling for the

amount of information content in the earnings announcement.A
The procedure is necessary because JS [1985]

find that the

speed of stock price adjustment is directly related to the

AThe information-content is measure by the amount of
unexpected earnings.
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amount of information-content of the earnings announcement.
Specifically, the adjustment process is faster for firms
which have less information-content in their earnings
announcement than for firms which have more information
content in their earnings announcement.
[1986]

failure to control

Therefore, JS's

for the information-content of the

two groups may have biased their results.

Options and Information Processing
There is some empirical evidence supporting the
proposition that options trading enhances information
processing,

and hence the informational efficiency of the

securities markets.

Manaster and Rendleman

(MR)

[1982]

suggest that options trading affects the way stock prices
adjust to the release of information relevant to the firm.
MR test and find support for the hypothesis that options
prices contain information that is not reflected in stock
prices for a period of up to 24 hours.

This suggests that

options prices reflect the options market's own assessment
of stock value instead of the contemporaneously observed
stock price.

Other studies which find that the options

market leads the stock market include Bhattacharya

[1987],

Snelling [1986], and Anthony [1988].
The above findings have significant implications for
the role of options trading in market efficiency.
reason is that if options prices simply reflect the

The
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contemporaneously observed stock price, then the amount of
information being processed is the same with or without
options trading.

On the other hand,

if the options markets

process information independently of stock markets,

then the

amount of information being processed should be equal to or
greater than the amount of information processed by the
stock markets alone.

Options and Relative Market Efficiency
Diamond and Verrecchia

(DV)

[1987]

infer that because

the options markets place fewer restrictions on establishing
a short position,
news)

private information

(especially the bad

is impounded into prices much more quickly.

result,

As a

DV predict that options listing would influence the

magnitude of stock prices adjustments to public information
such as annual earnings announcements.

Specifically,

D V 's

model suggests that introducing options trading reduces the
average absolute value of (excess)
days.

In other words,

returns on announcement

firms with options trading are

relatively more informationally efficient.
DV suggest that one can measure relative efficiency by
examining the time series changes of the average absolute
value of (excess)

returns on announcement days before and

after the options listing.

In other works,

DV's model
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implies that, ceteris paribus, options listing reduces the
information content of the earnings announcements of firms.’
The DV model is different from other studies in one
very distinct aspect.

While other studies investigate the

effeet of options trading on the speed of adjustment to
publicly available information (e.g., earnings
announcements),

the DV model explores the effect of options

trading on the speed of adjustment to private information
(i.e., before earnings are announced).

In different terms,

one may say that DV are interested in the ex ante instead of
ex post effects of options trading on earnings announcement.

3.4

Summary and Evaluation
The advent of options markets has created a lot of

excitement in security markets and academic research alike.
One of the main concerns in research is the role of options
in market efficiency.

Some studies have found that options

trading enhances the speed of stock price adjustments to
publicly available information (e.g., earnings
announcements).

Other research has found that options

trading has facilitated information processing.

Diamond and

’Beaver's U statistics is measured as the variance of
price reaction (proxied by square of excess return) during
the announcement divided by the variance of the
nonannouncement period.
Therefore, if the absolute value of
the (excess) return during the announcement is reduced so is
Beaver's U statistic.
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Verrechia's

(DV)

[1987] theoretical model suggests that

options trading enhances the speed of adjustment to
'private' information.
The DV model is appealing in that it involves the
concept of relative market efficiency and it can be
empirically tested.

However,

the fact that the DV model

considers only one attribute (short-selling constraints)

of

options listing has restricted the interpretation of the
role of options in informational efficiency.

Other

attributes of options are potentially helpful in improving
informational efficiency: higher leverage and lower
transaction costs.

For instance, with higher leverage and

lower transaction costs,
to afford)

investors may be willing

(or able

to spend more money on information processing and

private information acquisition.

As a result,

firms are

more efficiently priced and the market is more
informationally efficient.
Since research generally finds that small firms are
comparatively less efficiently priced, the effect of options
listing may be greater for small
firms (NYSE or AMEX).

Moreover,

(OTC)

firms than for large

as mentioned by Atiase

[1987], simply being listed in an exchange may give the
listed firms greater exposure and create more opportunities
for private information acquisition.

In this respect,

options listing may benefit OTC firms more than NYSE or AMEX
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firms,

since OTC firms were not listed in any other exchange

before the options listing.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter presents the methodology to test whether
options listing has an impact on the information content of
annual earnings announcements.
six sub-sections:
collection,

The chapter is divided into

(1 ) research questions,

(2 ) data

(3) measurement of information-content,

research design,

(4)

(5) hypotheses, and (6 ) statistical

analysis.

3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study examines the effects of options listing on
the

informational efficiency of the securities markets.

The information-content of annu " 1 earnings announcements is
a measure of such effects.

The idea is that if options

listing enhances the informational efficiency of the
securities market,

then firms with listed options will be

more efficiently priced.

Consequently,

the information-

content of earnings announcements for these firms would be
reduced compared to these without options listing.
important research questions of this study are:
Ql: What is the impact of options listing on the
information-content of the annual earnings
announcement of exchange firms?
Q 2 : What is the impact of options listing on the
information-content of the annual earnings
announcement of OTC firms?
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Tne most
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Many studies

(e.g., Grant [1980], Atiase

[1980;1987])

have found that the information-content of annual earnings
announcements is inversely related to the size of firms.
Based on the discussion in chapter 2, the conjecture is that
the impact of options listing on the information-content of
annual earnings announcements would be greater for small
firms than for large firms.

The exchange firms are divided

into two groups based on their market value

(i.e., total

market shares outstanding multiplied by share price).
order to form a match group design,

In

the exchange firms are

divided in half according to their median price in the year
before options listing.
Q 3 : Does options listing have a stronger impact on the
information-content of annual earnings announcements
of small exchange firms than of large exchange
firms?
Lastly,

Diamond and Verrechia

[1987] suggest that

investors with bad news would prefer to trade in the options
market rather than in the stock market because of the shortselling constraints
Therefore,

(up-tick rule)

in the stock market.

a priori. the impact of options listing on the

information-content of earnings announcements should be
stronger for firms with negative unexpected earnings than
for firms with positive unexpected earnings.

Consequently,

the study will also investigate whether an options-related
differential impact exists on the information-content of
annual earnings announcements of firms with positive and
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with negative unexpected earnings.

The fourth questions

is:
Q4 : Does options listing have a stronger impact on
exchange firms that have negative unexpected
earnings than on firms that have positive
unexpected earnings?

3.2 Data Selection
The data for this study include firms from NYSE, AMEX,
and OTC that have options newly listed between 1980 and 1986
in any of the five option exchanges: CBOE, AMEX,
and PSE.

NYSE, PHLX,

The stock returns data of the exchange firms are

obtained from the Center of Research into Securities Prices
(CRSP)

tape;

the stock return data of the OTC firms are

obtained from the National Association of Security Dealers
Automatic Quotations

(NASDAQ) tapes.

The EPS forecast data

are obtained from the Value Line Investment Survey, while
the actual EPS data are obtained from the WSJ Index.

The

earnings announcement date is the date that appears on the
WSJ Index.

In addition, the Broad tape day which is usually

one day before the WSJ announcement day is also used to test
for the options 1 isting effect.

Prior studies using daily

data generally reported increased return variability on both
the WSJ announcement day
-1)

(day 0) and the Broad tape day (day

(Patell and Wolfson [1981]).

Therefore,

the impact of

options 1 ist ing is expected to be strongest on these two
days.
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Other signi ficant events, such as mergers, stock
splits,

litigation ,etc.,

that are announced within one

week of the earnings announcements date will potentially
confound the events, and, therefore, the data for those
firms will not be included in the study.
Firms that do not have complete data in any of the
above sources are excluded from the study.

Moreover,

if a

listed firm is delisted from the option exchange within one
year,

it is not included in the study because it is likely

that the firm's options were not actively traded.

Unexpected Earnings
In the study, the unexpected earnings are obtained by
comparing the analysts' earnings per share

(EPS)

and the actual EPS before extraordinary items.
studies

forecast
Several

(Brown and Rozeff [1978;1979]; Collins and Hopwood

[1980]; Fried and Givoly [1982]; and Imhoff and Pare [1982])
have found that financial analysts' predictions of EPS are
at least as accurate as those produced by statistical
models.

For the purpose of this study, the sign of

unexpected earnings is positive if the actual EPS is larger
than the forecast EPS and vice versa.
El5® actual - EPSforera5L
HE = ----------------------EPS forecast
Daily Stock Return
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This study uses daily stock returns instead of monthly
or weekly stock returns.

Daily returns are used because

studies have found that daily stock returns are more
sensitive to informational events than are monthly data
(Patell and Wolfson [1982], Brown and Warner
However,

[1985]).

there are problems uniquely related to using daily

stock returns: non-normality of daily stock returns and
nonsynchronous trading.
Non-normality of daily stock return -- Fama

[1965]

suggests that the distribution of daily returns is fat
tailed rather than normally distributed,
true for daily excess returns
p.4]).
data.

However,

and the same holds

(Brown and Warner [1985,

based on a simulation study using daily

Brown and Warner (BW)

[1985] conclude that the non

normality of daily returns has no obvious impact on event
study methodologies.

The standard parametric tests for the

significance of the mean excess return are well-specified.
In fact,

BW found that the daily data comparatively has much

greater power than the monthly data in various tests.
Non-synchronous trading of sample firms —

Non

synchronous trading occurs when the stock return of a firm
and the return on the market index are measured over a
different trading interval.

The presence of non-synchronous

trading would cause the parameters of the Ordinary Lease
Square

(OLS) market model to be biased and inconsistent

especially with the daily data.

For instance,

firms with
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shares infrequently traded would cause the beta

(0 ) to be

downwardly biased, while those shares frequently traded
would cause the f3 to be upwardly biased.

The non-

synchronous trading problem is a particular concern for the
OTC firms since not all of them are actively traded.
The non-synchronous trading problem should not present
a major problem in this atudy because one criteria of
listing an option is that the firm's stock be actively
traded. Nevertheless,

Brown and Warner [1985]

indicate that

"failure to take into account non-synchronous trading in
estimating market model coefficients does not result in
misspecification of event study methodologies using the OLS
market model."
One approach to correct the non-synchronous trading
problem is to use the Scholes-Wil1iams procedure instead of
the OLS m o d e l .

The details of the OLS market model and the

Scholes-Wil1iams model are given in the following section.

4.3 MEASUREMENT OF INFORMATION-CONTENT
This study uses Beaver's U-statistic to measure the
information-content of earnings announcements,

but daily

returns instead of monthly returns will be used.

However,

to appreciate the proposed ratio, a brief review of the four
steps involved in calculating the U-statistic is presented.

Step 1. Obtain the normal (or expected) returns on
the earnings announcements day by using the
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OLS market model.
The OLS Market Model -- in any event study, a major
concern is to determine the extent to which the security
price performance around the event time has been abnormal.
To do that, a model that generates a 'normal'
return is needed.

(or expected)

Normal returns are typically determined

using the OLS market model.

One advantage of the OLS market

model is that it isolates the effect on prices

(and returns)

of firm-specific events from other economy-wide events.
this study, the market model developed by Markowitz

In

[1952]

and Sharpe [1963] will be used:

— Oi +
where

+ Mu

(1 )

jilt = an error term,
R 1l = return of security i at time t,
R,,,, = return of market portfolio at time t.

Step 2. Determine the variance during the announcement
period. The variance during the announcement
period is approximated by the square of
excess return.
The excess return is the difference
between the actual and the expected return
(from equation 1 ).
Mit - R il " [“. +

i =
t

<#ilt)2 =

<Rit -

[a, +

R^])2

=

AND N

(2)

0

(3)

where M and N are the observations from the exchange firms
and OTC firms respectively.
And t = 0 is the day of WSJ
earnings announcement.

Step 3. Calculate the variance during the nonannouncement
period. The variance of the residual during the
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nonreporting period is estimated from a 100 days
period ended 2 0 days prior to the earnings
announcement d a t e :
ii
S2(Mi) =

t = -120,......-20

(4)

T - 2
where T is the number of observations in the nonreporting
period used to estimate a t and
in equation 1 .
Step 4. The final step is to compute the U-statistic
by using the variance (from eq. 3) during the
announcement period divided by the variance
during the nonannouncement period (from eq. 4):
U tt = M 2,t/SZ(Mi)

(5)

If the earnings announcement has information-content,
then the sample variance of the residual during the
reporting period (m2h) should be significantly greater than
during the nonreporting period

(S 2 (a*t) ) -

at the time of earnings announcement

Therefore,

the U 1L

(t = 0 ) should have a

value significantly larger than 1 .

Scholes-Wil H a m s

Procedure

To correct the non-synchronous trading problem,

the OTC

firms use the Scholes-Wil1iams procedure instead of the OLS
market model to estimate the unexpected returns.
Scholes-Williams procedure is as follows:

The
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Mtt ~ ®it ~ [a t +

(®)

where
1 t=-20
at = —
£ R lt
100 t=-12 0
0L

= (0,

1
-

0t

100

t=-2 0
L
t=-120

(7)

+ 0! + */)/(! + 2p) J

(8)

where 0 t~ and 0 t+are the OLS estimation period values of
cov(R,
R».t i)
------------------(R-.t i)
respectively,

cov(Rt t, R » t+1)
and — ---—
a(R. t)a(R. tn)

,

and p is the estimation period value for the

first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the Equally
Weighted Market Index
317, e q s . 13-15,

(see Scholes and Williams

[1977, p.

19,20]).

3.4 RESEARCH DESIGH
There are two main groups of sample firms: exchange
firms and OTC firms.

Exchange firms have stocks listed on

either NYSE or AMEX, while OTC firms are firms that have
stocks traded over-the-counter.

These two groups of firms

are first analyzed individually for the options effects
Table 3.1 and Table 3.4).
divided into two groups

(see

The exchange firms are then

(large and small)

(measured by the total market value)

based on size

(see Table 4.2).

main reason for such a division is to see wether options
listing has a differential impact on firms of different

The
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Table 3.1
Comparison of Average U-»tatistic of Exchange Firms
Before and After Options Listing

Exchange Firms
Before Option
U (day -20)

After Option
U (day -20)

to

U (day +20)

to

U

(day + 2 0 )

Table 3.2
Comparison of Change in Average U-statistic
of Large and Small Exchange Firms

Large Firms
CU
CU (day -20)

to

CU (day + 2 0 )

Small Firms
CU
CU (day -20)

to

CU (day +20)

(CU)

Table 3.3
Unexpected-Earning* Categories and Suaeary of U-stati*tic

Exchange Fire*
Before O p 1 1 on

Unexpected-Earnings
Category
1. Most Favorable
2. Less Favorable
3. Neutral
4. Less Unfavorable
5. host Unfavorable

Announcement Day

Announcement Day

Degree of
Surprise
Criter ion
> + 30Z

After Option

-20

<

cr,1, - M

<

■>

u

M

+20

u

-20
U

>

<

+20
U

», 2*

lf*2*

ft
+ 1 IX to +30Z
-5Z to +5X
-30Z to - H Z
< -30Z

U

s, »

u S,(

■> u

3,0*

U

i, » <r

U

3,*

U

5,+2#

Tabla 3.4
Comparison of Average u-statistic of OTC Firma
Bafora and After Options Listing

OTC Finns
Before Option
U (day - 2 0 )
to

U

(day +20)

After Option
U (day -20)
to

U (day +20)
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size.
Finally, to control for the magnitude of unexpected
earnings,

firms are then classified into five groups

according to their unexpected-earnings percentage
Table 3.3).

(UE)

(see

The UE is computed as follows:

UE = [EPSa(.tlial - EPSforet:ilBt]/ EPS
The daily average U-statistic is computed from twenty
days before to twenty days after the earnings announcement
date in order to capture the pre-announcement and post
announcement effects of options listing as well.

If options

listing has an impact on the information-content of annual
earnings announcements,

the U-statistic during that period

should be reduced after firms have options listing.
Therefore,

the U-statistic within each group (i.e., exchange

and OTC firms)

is

listing to see if

analyzed both before

and

after options

the information-content of the annual

earnings announcement is affected by options listing.
In addition,
impact of options

in order to test for the differential
listing on the large and small

change in U-statistic

firms, the

(CU) of the large and small firms

during the announcement period is compared to test whether
they are significantly different.

The CU of a group is the

different in average U-statistic between the BO year and the
AO year on a particular day.

Likewise,

the CU of the

negative unexpected earnings group and the positive
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unexpected earnings groups is tested to see if they are
significantly different.

3.5 HYPOTHESES
The main hypothesis of this study is that options
listing would reduce the information-content of annual
earnings announcements.

The reason is that if options

listing enhances the informational efficiency of the
securities market,

then firms should be more efficiently

priced after than before the options are listed;
consequently, the earnings announcements of firms in the
year after options listed should become less informative.
Therefore,

the first hypothesis investigates whether options

listing reduces the information content of annual earnings
announcements of exchange firms.

All hypotheses are stated

in their alternative forms.
The average U-statistic during annual earnings
announcements of exchange firms decreases significantly
in the year after they have options listed.
In statistical notation form,
H 1•

U KXH.nn,t >

^EXB.AO.t

fc=

— I

or

0

The second hypothesis investigates whether the options
effects is greater for smal 1 exchange firms than large
exchange firms.
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H2: The amount of change (decrease) in the U-statistic
(CU) during annual earnings announcements of small
exchange firms is significantly greater than for larga
exchange firms.
In statistical notation form,
HZ! CUg* t > cu^ t

t= -l or 0

The third hypothesis investigates whether the effect of
options listing is greater on exchange firms that have
negative unexpected earnings than on exchange firms that
have positive unexpected earnings.
H 3 : The amount of change (decrease) in the U-statistic
(CU) during annual earnings announcement of exchange
firms that have negative unexpected earnings is
significantly greater than for firms that have
positive unexpected earn ings.
In statistical notation form,
Hjl DUjup t^ > DUpgg t

t= -1 or 0

The last hypothesis is similar to the first three
hypothesis except it is for the OTC firms.
H(,: The average U-statistic during annual earnings
announcements of OTC firms decreases significantly in
the year after they have options listed.
In statistical notation form,
H**

Uon:, no, t >

^orc.Ao.t

^

®

3.6 Statistical Analysis
This study uses test procedures similar to those used
by Patell

[1976] and McNichols and Manegold [1983].

They
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have derived a parametric Z-statistic to test for the
changes in U-statistic.
following manner.

The Z-statistic is developed in the

Assuming that the estimation- and

announcement-period means are not significantly different
and that returns are independently distributed,
(unexpected return or residual term)

then the t*iL

from equation 1 are

distributed such that
E(Mit> = 0

(9a)

var(*ilt) = (1 + l/T) ct,2,

(9b)

where (1 + l/T) reflects the increase in variance due to
prediction outside the estimation period.
cov

(Mi,/Mil) = <*ia/T for

s*t,

(9C)

where a * is the variance of the estimation period and T is
the number of days in the estimation period.
For any
individual day in the announcement period,
cov (*i1L,/iJt) K 0,

i*j ,

<9d)

where t goes from -20 to +20 days.
Since the study is
conducted in event time, it is reasonable to assume crosssectional independence.
Since

is a function of

and 0 it it is distributed

independently of s tz (the variance during the non-reporting
period).

Therefore,

the following independent variables may

be developed.
Standardized Prediction Error:
Mtt/fffiU+VT)*] ~ N(o,i) ,
[

(T-l)

3 *1 / 0 * ~ X 2 ( t - l )

,

(ioa)
(10b)
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Under the conditions of Eq.(9a) to (9d), the following
random variable is distributed as a t-statistic with

(T - 1)

degrees of freedom:
V lt = Mit/ [■it1 + l/T>']~t<T - 1),

(11)

with
E(Vlt)

=

o

and

var(vlt)= (T -l)(T -

3)

In the following, a Z-statistic is derived to test for
differences in U-statistic in the before-option year versus
the after-option year.

Squaring the V lt in E q .11 produces

an F-stat istic:
+ l/T)]

~

F(1,T - 1),

where
E ( p i t V [ » i 2 <l +

l/T)])

=

(T - 1) / (T

-

3)

This ratio can be standardized to give the following Ustatistic:
D it _ ,E(#lit2(T -

3 ) / [ S i 2 (l

+ l/T) (T - 1)])

where
E(Ult) = 1

and

var(Uit) - 2*(T - 2)/<T - 5),

By applying the Lindeberg Central Limit Theorem, an
approximate normal Z-statistic can be constructed:
Uflo.t — ^*D,L
Z D .t =

-

[4*(T-2)/N*(T — 5) ]
A similar Z-statistic is derived to test for the
differences in changes in average U-statistic between two
groups such as large and smal 1 firms.
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Since

EtUpo,.) = 1

and

EtU^,,) = 1,

therefore
E (CD) = B{UM t - 0*0 t) = 0

and

var = 4*(T - 2)/(T - 5)

and
t — CUjjQ t
Z c t=

----------- —

--------—

--------_

_

--------------------- ------

[4 * (T-2)/nj*(T-5) + 4 * (T-2)/n2*(T-5>]*

In addition to the parametric Z-statistic derived
above, the non-parametric Wilcoxon test is performed to
ensure that the results are not dominated by outliers
Conover [1980]).

(see

The statistical tests on day 0 and day -1

are a one-tail tests since the theory predicts that the Ustatistic would decrease during the earnings announcement
day.

On the other hand, the direction of change in the rest

of the days are unpredictable therefore
used.

two-tail tests are

CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESDLTS AND AHALYBI8 OF DATA
A description of the sample and the results of Ustatistic analysis of both the NYSE/AMEX firms and the OTC
firms are presented in this chapter.

4.l Sample Selection
There were 377 NYSE/AMEX firms that have options newly
listed on the five options exchanges between 1981 and 1986.
However, according to the data selection criteria outlined
in chapter 3 (page 33), only 170 firms have complete data.
As shown in Table 4.1A, the sample size ranges from a low of
12 firms in 1984 to a high of 50 firms in 1982.

The

selection procedures produced a large enough sample of
exchange firms to provide a statistical valid representation
of the firms in that period of t i m e .
On the other hand, since the OTC firms do not have
options listed in any options exchange until

1985, the data

selection are limited to only two years (1985 and 1986).
There are 69 OTC firms that have options newly listed in
that period of time.

Of the 69 firms, there are only 36

firms that have data in the WSJ Index and NASDAQ tapes.

Of

the 36 firms, only 23 firms have data on value line as well.
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Table 4 .ia
Distribution of Sample Firms by
Ysar in Which Thsy hava Options Mawly Listed
Stock Exchange
Exchange
(NYSE/AMEX)
OTC

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986

Total

44

14

50

18

12

19

13

170

0

0

0

0

0

21

15

36

Table 4.IB
Distribution of Firms in Options Exchange Listing
OPTIONS EXCHANGE

Exchange Firms
(NYSE/AMEX)
OTC

PSE

CBOE

AMEX

NYSE

PHLX

37

41

5

45

42

4

16

3

4

9
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Table 4.1C
Exchange Firms Average Market Talus
Before and Aftsr Options Listing
(in millions)
Average Market Value
Before Option
(BO)
Exchange Firms
(NYSE/AMEX)
OTC

After Option
(AO)

1, 152

1,463

544

595

Table 4.ID
Exchangs Firms Avsrags Bata
Bsfors and Aftsr Options Listing
Average Beta
Before Option After Option
(AO)
(BO)
Exchange Firms
(NYSE/AMEX)
OTC

t-test

1.354

1.423

-1. 07

2 .527

2 .561

-0.11
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Esshange Listing
The chosen sample firms are listed in five different
options exchanges.

As shown in Table 4.IB, the numbers of

exchange firms listed range from five in NYSE to forty-five
in PHLX.

The NYSE did not list options until 1985, which

explains why there are relatively few firms listed in that
exchange.

Other than NYSE, the sample firms are evenly

spread across the other four options exchanges.

For the OTC

firms, the options exchange listing ranges from three in the
NYSE to sixteen in AMEX (see Table 4.IB).

Market Value of Sample Firms
Table 4.1C shows the average market value of firms
before and after options listing.

For the exchange firms,

the average market value increases from $1,152 million in
the year before options listing
the year after options listing
increase.

(BO) to $1,463 million in
(AO) or a 27 percent

For the OTC firms, however, the average market

value increases from $544 mill ion in the BO year to $595
million in the AO year or a 9 percentage increase.
expected,

As

the average size of the OTC firms is smaller than

that of the exchange f irms.

Average Betas of Firms
To obtain the abnormal returns and betas of exchange
firms, the OLS model

is used.

The average beta of firms is
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compared before and after options listing in Table 4.ID.
The average beta of exchange firms is 1.354 in the BO year
and 1.423 in the AO year.

The t-test showed that the beta

change is not significant at any meaningful level.
For the OTC firms,

in order to control for the non-

synchronous trading problem,

the Scholes-Wil1iams model is

used to compute the abnormal returns and beta of firms.

The

average beta of firms is 2.537 in the BO year and 2.561 in
the AO year.

Not surprisingly,

the t-test is not

significant for the OTC firms.

4.2 Empirical Results
The average U-statistic of firms before options listing
and after options listing is computed in order to test the
four hypotheses.

The average U-statistic from -20 days to

+20 days around the WSJ earnings announcement day is
computed by using Equation 5 in chapter 3 (page 38).

The

main reason for covering from -20 days to + 2 0 days is to
capture the pre-announcement and post-announcement option
effects.

By analyzing the data,

it appears that the options

effects have three phrases or periods.

Therefore,

to

enhance the analysis of the results, the whole period is
divided into three periods: pre-announcement period
to day -5), announcement period

(day -20

(day -4 to 0), and post

announcement period (day +1 to day +20).

However,

as far as

the hypotheses testing is concerned, the options effect is
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restricted to day -1 and 0 in the earnings announcement
period.

This issue was discussed previously on page 31.

Day

Day Day
+ 5 +4

+ 20

Pre-announcement
Period

Day

Day Day
0 +1

Announcement
Period

+ 20

Post-announcement
Period

The empirical analysis is carried out in the following
steps:

First, the U-statistic is compared for all 170

exchange firms to test for the overal 1 option 1 isting
effects.

Second,

firms are divided into two groups

(large

and small) by their market values in order to test for the
'size' hypothesis.

Third,

firms are divided into five

unexpected earnings groups to test for the
earnings' effect.

'unexpected

Finally, all the OTC firms are analyzed

for the options listing effects in the overall level.

4.2.1 All Exchange Firms
Table 4.2 reports the average U-statistic and the
statistical tests

(Z-statistic and Wilcoxon-test) of all the

exchange firms before and after options listing.

Both

statistics are used to test the hypothesis that the average
U-statistic during the announcement period in the year
before options listing is greater than that in the year
after options listing.

Tab la 4.2
Comparison of Avaraga U-atatlatic of All
Exchanga rirms Bafora and Aftar Options Listing
Average U-statistic
DAY

Z-statisticB

Wilcoxontest

0.988
0.924
0.960
1.450
1. 056
1. 643
1. 510
1.437
1. 098
1 .099
0 .994
1 .214
1 .066
1.381
1.233
0 .974
1.206
0 .808
1.246

-0.384
2.049**A
0 .123
-2.477**
-0.142
-1.947*
-3.096***
-1.129
0.262
0.425
0.934
-0.279
1.028
-1.728*
-1. 834*
-0.406
0 .294
3.557***
0 .708

0. 407
1.249
0. 127
-1.528

2 .231
1.506

1.220
1.304

6 .489***
1.293*

2 .095**
2.167**

1. 079
1. 308
1. 227
1. 391
1 .202
1. 277
1. 067
1. 091
1 .435
1 .174
1 .138
1.269
1 .160
1 .008
0 .980

1.208
1.243
1 .097
0.849
1. 015
1 .112
1. 089
1. 907
1. 130
0.968
0.981
1. 357
1. 187
0 .948
0 .990
0 .849
1. 248
1.207
0 .985
1 .186

-0.827
0.417
0.833
3 .476***
1 .198
0 .995
-0.143
1 .186
1.956*
1. 322
1 .002
-0.562
-0.178
0 .389
-0.066
0 .238
1. 491
0 .064
1. 597
1. 265

-0.813
-1.213
0. 133
2 .354**
0 .380
-0.892
-0.182
0 .946
1.806*
0.743
0.848
-0.267
-0.260
0.594
0.784
-0.523
- 1 .024
1. 040
1- 113
1. 381*

(BO)

(AO)

-2

0 .928
1. 244
0 .979
1. 064
1. 034
1. 340
1 028
1 .261
1. 139
1 .165
1. 139
1. 170
1 .226
1 .112
0. 94 7
0.911
1.252
1 .362
1. 356

-1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9

-20

-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
-12
-11
-1 0

-9
-8

-7
-6

-5
-4
-3

+ 10
+ 11
+ 12
+ 13
+ 14
+ 15
+ 16
+ 17
+ 18
+ 19
+ 20

0.886

1.480
1. 217
1. 234
1. 383

0.011

-1.415
-0.267
-1.080
-0.411
1 .02 1
1 .222
0.794
-0 . 0 1 2
-0.513
0.378
0.981
-0.913
2 .962***
1.633

A--Signifleant level: *--0.10; **--0,05; ***--0,01. B--A11 tests are
two-tail test except on day -1 and 0 which is one-tail test.

figure 4.1
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^nffl,BO,L > ^EKB.AO.t

t=— 1 OT 0

The analysis is performed in two stages.

In the first

stage the analysis is centered upon the announcement period.
In the second stage, the pre-announcement and post
announcement effects are examined.

During the announcement

period in the BO year, the average U-statistic on day -1 and
day 0 is 2.23 1 and 1.506 respectively.

In other words,

the

price reaction on the day before the WSJ earnings
announcement day is 2.231 times higher than during the non
announcement period.
In the AO year, the average U-statistic has dropped
down to 1.220 on day -1 and 1.304 on day 0.

As shown in

Figure 4.1,

the peak in the AO year is not apparent whereas

the peak in

the BO year is apparent.

Notably,

the U-

statistic in the announcement period is consistently lower
in the AO year than in the BO year.

As shown in Table 4.2,

the Z-statistic is significant at the 0.01 level for days -1
and -3.

The Wilcoxon test shows significant results on days

-1, and -3,

and also on day 0.

tests indicates

The consistency across

these

that the results are not dominated by

out 1 iers.
Before drawing any conclusions,

it is crucial to extend

the analysis to the pre-announcement period.
by looking at Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2,

For instance,

it is apparent that

the price activities in the AO year have increased during
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the pre-announcement period.

The Z-statistic indicates that

on days - 6 , -7 , -14, -15, and -17 the U-statistic in the AO
year is significantly higher than in the BO year. Only on
day -19 is the U-statistic in the BO year significantly
higher than in the AO year.
other hand,

The Wilcoxon test, on the

shows that no pair of U-statistic in the pre-

announcement period is significantly different.
In the post-announcement period, the price activity
seems to carry on for about ten days in the BO year.

Prior

studies have found that the price does not immediately
adjust to the earnings announcements as claimed by the
efficient market hypothesis.

In fact, some studies have

found a post-announcement drift which lasts up to two weeks
after the earnings announcement.

The results in this study

are consistent with those findings,

particularly for the BO

year.

However, there is no evidence of a drift in the AO

year.

It appears that options listing have dampened the

drift with the exception of the first day or two after the
announcement.

The result is consistent with the notion that

options firms are more efficiently priced.
Figure 4.1 shows that price activity is generally
reduced during the post-announcement period.

The Z-

statistic shows significant results on day +4 and +9,
indicating that the U-statistic in the AO year is
significantly lower.

The results are supported by the

Wilcoxon test and the t-test.
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In conclusion, both the parametric and nonparametric
statistics have provided sufficient evidence to support the
hypothesis that options listing has significantly reduced
the U-statistic during the annual earnings announcement
particularly on the Broad tape day (day -1).

In other

words, options listing does reduce the information-content
of annual earnings announcement.

In addition,

there is an

observed increase in price reactions during the pre
announcement period,

indicating that the information related

to the earnings announcement was impounded into the market
as many as 17 days earlier.

Moreover, the empirical

findings show that the post-announcement drift disappears
after the firms have options listed.

The results are

consistent with the notion that options firms are more
efficiently priced.

4.2.2 Large vs. Small— the 'Size* Hypothesis
The purpose of this section is to test the hypothesis
that options listing has a stronger impact on the
information-content of small firms than on large firms.
This test is referred to as the 'size' hypothesis.
H 2: CU sh t > CU ijg t
where C U ^ t = U sm.bo.l “

t= -1 or 0
and C U ^ t — DljG>BO_t -

^ t

The exchange firms were classified as large and small
by spliting the 17 0 firms according to their median market
values in the BO year.

The 85 firms with the highest market
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values are labeled large firms; the 85 firms with the lowest
values are labeled small firms.
firms usually does not fluctuate,
group in the AO year.

Since the market value of
firms remain in the same

One advantage of this research design

is that firms of the large and small group are matched to
themselves in the BO and AO year.

Average Market value
The average market value of the large firms is $1,911
million in the BO year and $2,398 million in the AO year
(see Table 4.3A), while the average market value of the
small firms is $392 million in the BO year and $510 million
in the AO year.

Since the average market value of the large

firms is almost five times as much as that of the small
firms,

it should provide a sufficient distinction for these

two groups of firms to test the 'size' hypothesis.

Average Beta
The average beta of the large firms is 1.120 in the BO
year and 1.257 in the AO year {see Table 4.3B); the average
beta of the small firms is 1.603 in the BO year and 1.607 in
the AO year.

The t-tests show that these changes are not

significant.

Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis

that the average beta for large or small firms do not differ
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Table 4.3A
Comparison of tbs Average Msrkst Talus of Largs and Small
Exchange Firms Bsfors and Aftsr Options Listing
(in millions)
Average Market Value
Before Option
(BO)

After Option
(AO)

LARGE

1,911

2,198

SMALL

392

510

Tabls 4 . 3B
Comparison of the Avsrags Beta of the Large
and Small Exchange Firms Before and After Options Listing

Average Beta
Before Option After Option
(BO)
(AO)

t-test

1 .120

1.257

-1.34

SMALL

1 .603

1.607

n
O
0

1

LARGE
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due to options listing.
As expected,

the beta for the small firms is much

higher than the beta for the large firms.

One reason for

the difference is that smaller firms usually are growing
firms; therefore,

they tend to be riskier than large firms.

Statistical Analysis
During the announcement period in the BO year, both the
large firms and small firms peaked on day -1 (see Figure
4.2A and 4.2B).

However,

the peak for the large firms is

not as high as for the small firms.
Grant [1980], and Atiase

[1987])

Prior studies

(e.g.,

have found that the price

reactions of the small firms during the earnings
announcement period is higher than that of large firms.

The

result of this study is consistent with the previous
findings.

In the BO year, the U-statistic for the smaller

firms on day -1 is 2.603

(see Table 4.4B), while the U-

statistic for the large firms is only 1.833
4.4A ) .

Before testing the

(see Table

'size' hypothesis,

the large and

small groups are analyzed individually.

Large Firms
Figure 4.2A shows that the U-statistic of the large
firms is generally lower in the AO year during the
announcement period.

The Z-statistic shows that the U-
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Table 4.4A
comparison of Average u -statistic of Large
Exchange Firms Bsfors and After options Listing
Average U--statistic
DAY

Z-statistic'h

Wilcoxontest

(BO)

(AO)

0. 927
1. 096
0 .634
0.992
0.820
0.844
0.944
1. 352
1.024
0. 942
0 .979
1. 152
1.136
1 .569

1 .108

-0.820
0.210

1.0 12
0 .860

1. 049
0.953
1. 521
1.123
1 .800
1 .181
1.254
1. 050
1. 072
0.839
0.996
1.154
1. 619
1. 446
0.884

-1.447
-2 .398 * *B
-1.375
-4 .339***
-1.074
0 .448
-0.118
-0.590
0 .637
0. 707
-0.081
-0 .226
-1.972**
-0.113

-1
0

1.311
1. 460
1 .212
1.833
1.647

1 .023
0.873
1. 104
1.180
1. 183

1. 308
2 .667***
0.489
2.964***
2.106***

0.516
2 .702***
1.756*
0 .712
1.419*

+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9

1. 142
1. 692
1.350
1. 722
1. 123
1. 536
1.350
1. 164
1. 542

1 .168

+ 10
+ 11
+ 12
+ 13
+ 14
+ 15
+ 16
+ 17
+ 18
+ 19
+ 20

1.21 2

-0.114
1.724*
0. 309
4 .831***
0.913
3 .375***
1 .116
1.849*
1. 073
1 .601
0. 642
0.243
0.873
-0.155
0. 069
-0.069
1. 038
-2.016**
0.371
0. 677

-0.060
-0.374
0 .818
2.897***
1. 328
0.447
1. 172
0.060
0.715
1. 073
0 .028
0 .163
-1.318
0. 672
0.740
0. 534
-1.413
0. 134
0.983
0. 986

-20

-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
-12
-11
- 10

-9
-8

-7
-6

-5
-4
-3
-2

1. 079
1. 214
0.953
0.895
0 .866
0. 941
1. 594
1. 242
1. 236
1. 313

1.312
1 .282
0 .658
0 .922
0 .793
1. 104
0 .756
1 .305
0 .860
0 .937
1 .160
0 .761
0 .929
0 .851
0 .957
1. 365
1. 687
1. 154
1. 164

-0.757
0.328
-1.387
-1.463
0. 042
-1.933*
-0.855
-0.974
-1.027
0. 134
1 .181
0. 791
0. 452
-0,249
-0.394
1. 063

A--Significant level: *-'0.10; **--0.05; ***--0.01. B--A11 tests
are two-tail test except on day -1 and 0 which is one-tail test.
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Tabla 4.4B
Comparison of Avaraga O-statistio of Small
Exchanga Firms Bafora and Aftar Options Listing
DAY
-20

-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
- 12
- 11
-10

-9
-8

-7
-6

-5
-4
-3
-2

-1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+ 10
+ 11
+ 12
+ 13
+ 14
+ 15
+ 16
+ 17
+ 18
+ 19
+ 20

Average U-statistic
-------------------(BO)
(AO)

Z-statisticA

Wilcoxontest

1.018
1 .377
1.313
1. 124
1.236
1 .820
1 .10 0
1. 155
1. 240
1.375
1.286
1. 175
1.301
0 .642
0 .870
0 .951

0.957
0.7-9
0.956
1.363
0 .977
1.467
1.822
1. 604
1. 133
1. 113
1. 137
1.418
0.964
1 .127
1. 004
1. 052

2.670***B
1 .620
-1.085
1. 174
1. 603
-3 .278***
-2.036**
0.486
1. 187
0. 676
- 1. 1 0 0
1. 526
-2.203**
-0.607
-0.458

1. 367
1. 501
1. 535
-0.670
-0.007
-0.015
0 .330
-0.536
0 .391
1. 330
0. 538
0. 319
0. 472
-0.367
1. 005
0. 355

1 .178
1. 248
1. 484
2 .603
1.329

1.376
0 .734
1.373
1.246
1. 410

-0.896
2.334**
0. 506
6.159***
-0.368

-1.845*
1.403
0.550
2 .215*
1. 527*

1 .002

1.233
1 .160
0.899
1. 030
1. 096
1.438
1 .062
1. 046
0 .941
1. 065
1 .014
1. 538
1 .600
0. 955
1.118
0.721
1.116
0.713
0 .804
1. 194

-1.048
-1.138
0.861
0. 056
0.770
-1.975**
-1.317
-0.181
1.677*
0. 258
0. 766
-1.034
-1.124
0.703
-0.163
0. 450
1. 058
2.107**
1.874*
1 .101

-1.075
-1.365
-0 . 6 6 8
0 .464
-0.754
-1.803*
-1.422
1. 290
1.762*
- 0. 0 1 2
1. 169
-0.603
0. 837
0.071
0. 369
-1.228
0 .018
1. 351
0. 528
1. 024

0 .909
1 .089
1 .043
1 .266
1. 003
0.771
1 .006
1.310
1 .122
1. 183
1. 310
1. 352
1 .110
1 .082
0 .820

1. 349
1. 177
1. 217
1.437

0 .280

A--Significant level: *--0.10; **--0.05; ***--0.01. B--A11 tests
are two-tall test except on day -1 and 0 which is one-tail test.
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Tabla 4.4C
Comparison of Changs in Avaraga U-statistic Batwsan
Larga and Small Exchanga Firms
DAY
- 20

-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
-12
- 11
-10

-9
-8

-7
-6

-5
-4
-3
-2

-1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+ 10
+ 11
+ 12
+ 13
+ 14
+ 15
+ 16
+ 17
+ 18
+ 19
+ 20

Large
Firms
-0.181
0. 046
-0.319
-0.528
-0.303
-0.956
-0.237
-0.099
-0.026
-0.130
0*140
0 .156
-0.018
-0.050
-0.435
-0.025
0.268
0 .588
0 .108
0. 653
0.464
-0.025
0 .380
0 .068
1. 064
0.201

0.744
0.246
0. 407
0.237
0. 353
0. 142
0. 054
0. 192
-0.034
0 .015
-0.020
0 .229
-0.444
0 .082
0 .149

Small
Firms
CULG.t
0 .062

0. 588
0. 357
-0.239
0 .259
0 .353
-0.722
-0.449
0 .107
0 .262
0.149
-0.242
0 .3 j 6
-0.485
-0,134
-0.101
-0.197
0.514
0 .112

1. 357
-0.073
-0.231
-0.251
0. 190
0 .012
0. 170
-0.435
-0.290
-0.040
0.370
0. 057
0. 169
-0.228
-0.248
0. 155
-0.036
0 .099
0.233
0 .464
0.413
0 .243

Z-statisticA
-0.780
-1. 74 3 *B
-2.172**
-0.929
-1.806*
-4.209***
1. 561
1.760*
-0.428
-1.258
-0.027
1 .280
-1.139
1.400
-0.967
0 .244
1 .561
0.236
-0.012
-2.263**
1.725*
0 .661

2.028**
-0.391
3 .383***
0 .101
3.791***
1. 724*
1.438
-0 .427
0.951
-0.088
0. 905
1.415
-0.608
0. 164
-0.384
-0.014
-2.291**
-1.064
-0.300

Wilcoxon
test
-0.370
-1.065
-1.706*
-0.874
-1.349
-1.765*
-0.070
0. 459
-0.196
-2.027**
-0.073
-0.590
-0.604
0 .885
-0.386
-0.737
1. 069
0. 254
-0.353
-0.623
1.108
0. 356
0 .621

-0.356
0 .517
1.679*
1.754*
2 .317**
-0.216
-0.547
0. 257
-0.864
1 .062
-0.116
-0.737
-0.439
0 .109
-0.562
-0.676
-0.682
0. 408

A--Significant level; *-*0.10; **--0.05; ***--0.01. B--A11 tests
are two-tail test except on day -1 and 0 which is one-tail test.
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statistic in the AO year is significantly lower on day -1
and -3 of the announcement period.

The Wilcoxon test shows

significant results only on day -3.

One plausible

explanation for the inconsistency between the two tests on
day -1 is outliers; a few firms with a highly significant
difference in U-statistic dominate the results.
In the pre-announcement period, the Z-statistic shows
that the large firms have significant results on day -15 and
-17.

The Wilcoxon test barely coroborates the results for

day -15 but only significant at 0.25 level on day -17.

The

results indicate that information related to the earnings
announcement affects the market as many as eighteen days
before WSJ earnings announcement day in the year after
options listing.
In the post-announcement period,

Figure 4.2A shows that

there exists a post-announcement drift for the large firms
in the BO year.

The drift disappears in the AO year.

The

Z-statistic shows that the U-statistic in the AO year is
significantly lower on day +2, +4, + 6 , and + 8 , but higher on
day +18.

Yet, the Wilcoxon test showed a significant result

for only day +4.
In conclusion,

there is only mild evidence that options

listings reduces the information-content of annual earnings
announcement of large firms.

The fact that the Wilcoxon

test does not show consistent results with the Z-statistic
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indicates that the impact of options listing may be very
strong on certain firms but not on the others.

Small Firms
In the announcement period, the Z-statistic of the
small firms shows significant results on day -1 and -3.

The

Wilcoxon test is significant only on day -1 (see Table
4 .4B) .
The small firms have mixed results in the pre
announcement period.

For example, the Z-statistic shows

that the U-statistic in the AO year is significant higher on
day -7, -13, and -14; it is significantly lower on day -19.
The Wilcoxon test is significant only at 0.25 level on day 18 and -19.
In the post-announcement period,

Figure 4.2B shows

that, unlike the large firms, small firms do not show a
drift.

This phenomenon is contradictory to the claim that

post-earnings announcement drift is the result of market
inefficiency.

Large firms generally are more efficient than

small firms and as a result, the drift should appear in the
small firms.
During the post-announcement period, mixed results are
shown by the two tests.

Price reactions increase

significantly for both tests on day + 6 .

However, price

reactions decrease significantly for both tests on day +9
and for the Z-statistic on days +18 and +19.
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The conclusion drawn from the statistical results is
that options listing has a strong impact on small firms
during the earnings announcement period.

In other words,

options listing reduces the information-content of annual
earnings announcement of small firms.

During the pre

announcement and post-announcement periods,

the options

listing effects do not seem to have a clear pattern.

'Size* Hypothesis
After being analyzed individually,

the data were tested

statistically to see if the impact of options listing is
stronger on the small firms than on the large firms.
this section,
are presented.

the statistical tests of the

In

size' hypothesis

Table 4.4C presents the statistical results

of the hypothesis testing.

The figures on the first left-

hand column represent the change in average U-statistic (CU)
between the BO year and the AO year of the large firms.
example,

For

the number 0.464 on day 0 of Table 4.4C represents

the difference of 1.647 on day 0 of the BO year and 1.183 on
the day 0 of the AO year of Table 4.4A .
second column is for the smal1 firms.

Likewise, the

The signs of the

figures indicate the direction of differences.
example,

For

a negative sign means that the average U-statistic

is higher in the AO year and vice versa.

If the large and

small groups have the same sign on a particular day such as
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day - 1 , that means options listing has the same impact on
these two groups on that particular day.
One important note is that since the purpose of the
'size* hypothesis is to see if the impact of options listing
is "stronger" on the small group than on the large group;
therefore,

the Z-statistic is meaningful only to those days

that the two groups of firms have the "same" sign.
Otherwise,

the Z-statistic simply means that the two groups

are different but does not indicate whether the impact is
stronger on one group than on the other.
As far as hypothesis testing is concerned,

the analysis

is concentrated on those days that the two groups have the
same sign on C U .

During the announcement period, both

groups show a positive sign on CU from day -1 to day -3,
indicating that their U-statistic has decreased in the AO
year.

The Z-statistic only shows significant results on day

-1, whereas the Wilcoxon test shows insignificant results on
that day.

Based on the above results, the statistical

evidence only mildly supports the 'size' hypothesis.
0 , the two groups have different signs,

On day

indicating that

options listing has opposite impacts on these two groups.
In the pre-announcement period, there are many days
that the CU of the two groups has opposite signs,

indicating

that options listing may have an opposite effect on them.
Likewise,

in the post-announcement period, the CU of the two

groups has different signs on nine out of fifteen days.

As
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a result,

it is difficult to assess the differential options

listing impact on these two groups in the pre- and post
announcement periods.
In conclusion, the statistics provide mild evidence to
support the

'size' hypothesis.

In other words,

the results

do show that options listing has a slightly stronger impact
on small firms than on large firms during the earnings
announcement period.

The comparative analyses of the large

and small firms provide several interesting insights which
would help further research.

First,

it appears that after

options 1 isting, the information seems to impact the market
earlier for the large firms than for small firms.
example,

For

large firms showed an observed increase in the U-

statistics from day -18 to -14 in the pre-announcement
period.

A similar phenomenon can be observed for the small

firms from day -9 to day -5.

One plausible explanation is

the information of large firms is more accessible to the
analysts than that of small firms.

Therefore,

investors are

able to process or acquire the earnings information earlier.
Another observation is related to the post-earnings
announcement drift.

It only appears in the BO year of the

large firms but not in the AO year.

The drift lasts for

about two weeks, which is consistent with previous findings.
In the AO year, however,

the drift seems to disappear.

Further research is necessary to find out what really causes
the drift and why options listing seems to make the drift
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disappear.

Unlike the large firms, there is no apparent

drift observed in the small firms.

The results are

inconsistent with the theory that the drift is the result of
market inefficiency,

because large firms are generally more

informationally efficient than small firms.

4.2.3 The 'Unexpected Earnings* Hypothesis
This section presents the statistical results to test
the hypothesis that options listing has a stronger impact on
firms which have negative unexpected earnings

(NEG) than on

firms which have positive unexpected earnings

(POS).

The

design is similar to the previous design that the groups are
not matched groups:
H 3: CU^,. > CU** t

t = -1 or 0

Sample Data
Table 4 .5A shows the distributions of firms in the five
unexpected earnings categories.

However,

the number of

firms in group 1 and group 4 of the BO year is too small.
Likewise, the number of firms in group 1 and group 2 in the
AO year is also too small.

Since such a small number of

firms would make the statistical testing less meaningful,
group 1 and group 2 are combined into one negative
unexpected earnings group (NEG), and group 4 and group 5 are
combined into one positive unexpected earnings group

(POS).
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Table 4.5A
Distribution of Exchange r i m
in the Unexpected Earnings Criteria

Unexpected Earnings
Criteria
1. Most Favorable
2. Less Favorable
3. Neutral
4. Less Unfavorable
5. Most Unfavorable

Degree of
Surprise
Criterion

Sample Size
BO

AO

8

9

+11% - +30%

24

8

-5% - +5%

64

60

-30% - -11%

14

29

30

40

> +30%

< -30%

Table 4.5B
Distribution of Exchange Firms
in the Unexpected Earnings Criteria

Unexpected Earnings
Criteria
1. Postitive (POS)
2. Neutral

(NEU)

3. Negative (NEG)

Degree of
Surprise
Criterion
> +10%
-5% - +5%
< -10%

Sample Size
BO

AO

32

17

64

60

44

69
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Table 4.6A
Comparison of tbs Average Market Valua
of tha Unexpected Earnings Groups
(in millions)
Average Market Value
Unexpected
Earnings
Group
Positive
(POS)
Neutral
(NEU)
Negative
(NEG)

Before Option
(BO)

After Option
(AO)

871

1,408

1, 500

2 ,099

814

1,031

Table 4.6B
Comparison of tha Avaraga Bata of tha
Unexpected Earnings Groups
Average Beta
Unexpected
Earnings
Group

Before Option After Option
(AO)
(BO)

t-test

Posit ive
(POS)

1 -57

1.24

3 .25

Neutral
(NEU)

1. 24

1.43

3 .06

Negative
(NEG)

1.34

1.46

1.33
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Consequently,

instead of the original five-group design,

new design has only three groups: negative,
and positive

neutral

the

(NEU),

(as shown in Table 4.5B).

The average size of the firms (see Table 4. 6 A) in the
neutral group is relatively larger than that of the other
two groups, while the neutral group's beta
is relatively lower.

(see Table 4. 6 B)

The results are as expected.

Large

firms are relatively more stable in their earnings than
small firms, which explains why the large firms have lower
betas and smaller unexpected earnings.
By comparing Figures

4.3A, 4.3B, and 4.3C, one can

observe that the NEU group fluctuates less than the POS and
NEG groups.

In addition,

the NEU group does not have much

price activity around the announcement day except on day 0
of the BO year.

On the contrary,

the NEG group and the POS

group have a lot of activity around the announcement day of
the BO year. However,

the activity in both groups seems to

have declined in the AO year.
Before statistically testing the
hypothesis,

unexpected earnings'

the three groups are individually analyzed.

Occasionally,

the NEG group and the POS group are compared

to show their differences.

Neutral Unexpected Earnings Group (NEU)
In the announcement period,

the NEU group does not have
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much activity except on day -1 of the BO year (see Table
4.7B).
(2.853).

The U-statistic on this day is unexpectedly high
Both the Z-statistic and the Wilcoxon test shows

significant results for tha same day.
In the pre-announcement period,

the Z-statistic shows

significant changes from day -17 to day -12 with an
exception for day -13.

When the Wilcoxon test is used, only

day -12 and day -15 are significant.
announcement period,
only on day 44.

Likewise,

in the post

the Z-statistic and Wilcoxon test agree

All other days have significant result lor

one test but not the other test.

In conclusion,

there is

evidence of options listing impact on the NEU group during
the earnings announcement period and the pre-announcement
period.

During the post-announcement period, however,

the

evidence of options listing effect is guestionable.

Negative Unexpected Earnings Group

(NEG)

Figure 4.3C shows that in the AO year, there is a
general increase in price activity during the pre
announcement period; a general decrease in price activity
during the announcement period; and mixed results in the
post-announcement period.

The observed phenomenon is

consistent with the Diamond and Verrechia

(DV)

[1987] model,

which predicts that options listing would enhance the
release of private information in the pre-announcement

Tabla 4.7A
Comparison of Avaraga U-statistic of POS Exchanga Firms
Bafora and Aftar Options Listing
Average U -statistic
DAY
-20

-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
-12
-11
-1 0

-9
-8

-7
-6

-5
—4
-3
-2

-1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+ 10
+ 11
+ 12
+ 13
+ 14
+ 15
+ 16
+ 17
+ 18
+ 19
+ 20

Z-statisticD

Wilcoxontest

0.915
1. 048
0.571
1. 064
0. 684
0. 648
0 .802
1.405
0.424
0. 909
0.613
2 .024
0. 520
1. 009
0.725
1 .045

0. 107
0.723
1.733* a
0.650
1. 538
1.400
1.405
-0.442
2.489**
0. 759
1.138
-1.308
1. 015
- 0. 0 2 1
0.630
-0.778

-0.693
-0.761
-1.670*
0. 525
-0.903
-2 .984** *
-0.977
-0.304
-2 .394**
-0.094
-0.746
-0.283
-1.250
0.935
-0.840
-0.462

0 .942

- 0. 1 1 0
0 .800
0.922
1.055
2 .472**

-0.578
0 .357
-0.598
-1.407
-1.565*

-0.897
3.153***
0. 772
-0.037
0.942
1. 701*
0.181
- 0 . 9fc'
2 .1 ,8 **
2.165**
1. 323
-0.847

1. 534
0.735
0. 452
0 .052
-0.157
-0.651
-0.557
-0.231
-0.641
-1.512
-2.629**
-0.441
-0 . 2 1 0
-0.727
-1.471
0.798
-0.254
0. 389
-0.747
-0. 0 2 1

(BO)

(AO)

0. 962
1. 363
1. 327
1 .3 48
1 .354
1.259
1.415
1. 21 2

1 .509
1 .240
1. 109
1.453
0.963
0.999
1 .000
0 .705
0 .894
1 .035
1. 368
1. 407
2 .063
1 .016
2 .180

1. 474
1. 045
1. 093
2 .107
0. 595
0 .553
1.424
1. 548
0 .881
0.520
1. 015
0.535
0. 999
0 .344
1 .032
1 .314
0. 967
0. 996

0.686

0.965
0.946
0.985
1. 407
0. 805
1. 138
1 .061
0 .682
1. 365
0 .516
0.974
0.466
0. 604
0. 304
0. 889
0. 483
0 .556
0. 353
0.482
0.371
1.482
0.832
0.798

1. 221

-0.050
1.480
-0.316
1. 516
- 0 . 383
0 .308
0 .454

A - -S l gn i fle an t l e v e 1 : *--0.10; **- -0.05; * ** -* 0 . 0 1 . B- -All
are two -tail test e x c e pt on day -1 and 0 w h i c h is o n e -tail

tes ts
tes t .
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Table 4.7B
Comparison of Average u-statistic of NEU Exchange Firms
Firms Bafora and Aftar Options Listing
DAY
-2 0

-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
-12
-11
-10

-9
-8

-7
-6

-5
-4
-3
-2

-1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+ 10
+ 11
+ 12
+ 13
+ 14
+ 15
+ 16
+ 17
+ 18
+ 19
+ 20

Average U-statistic
-------------------(BO)
(AO)

Z-statisticB

0 .896
1. 143
0 .774
0.978
0. 591
0* 797
0.743
1. 297
0.810
1.234
1.463
1. 064
1.258
1.228
1 .006
1. 174

1. 146
1 .062
0.949
1.470
1. 149
1. 399
1. 183
1 .186
1. 309
1. 155
1. 191
0.902
0.983
1.400
1. 103
0 .887

-0.968
0. 311
-0.678
-1.904 *A
-2.163**
-2.333**
-1. 707*
0.433
-1.935*
0. 308
1. 050
0. 629
1. 065
-0.667
-0.374
1. 115

0. 065
-0.367
-0.192
0.510
0.485
2.470**
1. 047
1. 073
1.867*
0 .117
-1.123
-0.840
-0.237
-1.382
-0.627
-1.268

1.035
1.231
1. 300
2.853
1.412

1 .188

-0.591
0 .736
-0.296
5.756***
1. 191

0.287
-1.677*
-1.157
-1.925*
-1.603

0.811
-0.174
0 .139
4 .342***
1. 245
-0.350
1 .6 6 6 *
2.323**
1.661*
0. 196
0 .268
1. 265
-1.324
1 .806
-0.114
0 .299
-0.348
-0 .761
0.435
0.045

-0.947
-0.032
-1.305
-3.300**
-0.620
1 .080
0.382
-1.223
-0.842
-0.170
-0.170
-0.760
0.427
- 2 .328**
-1.315
0 .782
1. 562
-0.722
-0.652
-1. 125

1. 294
1.230
1 .192
1 .630
1 .203
0 .888
1. 447
1.353
1. 247
0. 994
1. 089
1 .222
0. 858
1. 179
0. 704
1. 003
1. 347
1 .2 12

1.213
1. 396

1 .041
1 .377
1.367
1. 104
1.085
1. 275
1. 156
0. 509
0 .882
0. 978
1. 017
0.754
0 .818
0. 943
1 .020
0 .896
1. 2 0 0

0.713
0 .734
0. 925
1.437
1. 409
1 .101
1. 385

Wilcoxontest

A--Significant level: *--0.10; **--0.05; ***--0.01. B-All tests
are two-tail test except on day -1 and 0 which is one-tail test.
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Table 4.7C
Comparison of Average U-statistic of NEG
Exchange T i m s Before and After options Listing
DAY
- 20

-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
-12
-11
-10

-9
-8

-7
-6

-5
-4
-3
-2

-1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+ 10
+ 11
+ 12
+ 13
+ 14
+ 15
+ 16
+ 17
+ 18
+ 19
+ 20

Average U-statistic
-------------------(BO)
(AO)

Z-statisticB

Wilcoxontest
0.556
1. 543
-0.913
-1 . 2 0 1
0.438
0 .162
0. 412
-0.580
-0 . 0 1 1
0 .8 8 6
-0.492
0. 035
- 0 .Ill
-0.388
-1.199
-1.080

1. 153
1. 395
1. 051
1 .075
1. 205
2 .168
1. 174
0 .990
0.928
0.936
0. 545
1. 150
1.758
1. 270
0.779
0 .736

0.940
0. 905
1 .160
1.719
1. 148
2 .264
1.911
1. 479
1 .166
1 .282
1. 164
1 .357
1.242
1 .662
1.373
1.272

1. 192
1. 193
1. 548
2.236
1.339

1 .175
0 .736
1. 194
1. 140
1.547

1.678*
1.303
4.031***
-0.765

-0.630
1.846*
0. 256
0 .910
0.403

0. 799
1. 030
0.778
0.743
1. 383
0. 987
0. 758
0. 705
1. 292
0.770
0.976
1. 586
2 .022
1.305
1 .168
1 .099
2 .126
1.219
1.603
1. 687

1. 394
1.233
0 .890
1. 074
1. 135
1.338
1. 287
1. 050
1. 598
1. 048
0. 940
2 .077
1.409
0.935
1.435
1.047
1.445
0 .948
0.806
1 .157

-2.188**
-0.747
-0.412
-1.219
0 .910
-1.291
-1.943*
-1.267
-1.123
-1 . 0 2 0
0. 133
-1.806
2 .255**
1. 358
-0.981
0. 191
2.507**
0. 996
2.933***
1.949*

-1 .926*
-1 .976**
-0.919
0 .250
-0.041
-1.599
-0.503
-0.830
1 .2/2
-0.103
-0.721
-1.749*
0 .862
-1.428
-1.584
-0.150
0.073
2.032**
0 .948
0.073

0, 782
1 .800*A
-0.400
-2 .370**
0. 209
-0.350
-2.713**
-1.798*
-0.872
-1.273
-2 .275**
-0.760
1.898*
-1.444
-2.185**
-1.972**
0 .060

A--Signifleant level: *--0.10; **--0.0^; ****-0.01. B--A11 tests
are two-tall test except on day -1 and 0 which Is one-tall test.
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Tabl* 4.7D
Comparison of Changs in Avarags u-statistic bstwssn
NEG and POS Group
DAY

NEG
Group

t
-2 0

-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
- 12
- 11
- 10

-9
-8

-7
-6

-5
-4
-3
-2

-1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+ 10
+ 11
+ 12
+ 13
+ 14
+ 15
+ 16
+ 17
+ 18
+ 19
+ 20

POS
Group

Z-statisticB

CUpos,t

0. 213
0. 489
-0.109
-0.644
0 .057
-0.095
-0.738
-0.489
-0.237
-0.346
-0.619
-0.207
0 .516
-0.393
-0.594
-0.536

0.047
0.315
0. 756
0. 284
0.671
0.611
0.613
-0.193
1 .085
0.331
0.496
-0.571
0.443
-0.009
0.275
-0.339

0 .016

0.456
0 .354
1.096
-0.208

-0.048
0 .349
0 .402
0.460
1.078

-0.095
1.2 60
-2 .548**

-0.595
-0.203
-0 . 1 1 2
-0.331
0 .248
-0.351
-0.529
-0.345
-0.305
-0.278
0.036
-0.491
0.613
0. 369
-0.267
0 .052
0 .682
0.271
0. 797
0.530

-0.391
1.375
0.337
-0.016
0.411
0 .742
0. 079
-0.420
0. 958
0 .944
0 .577
-0.370
0 .532
- 0. 0 2 2
0. 646
-0 .138
0 .661
-0.167
0.134
0. 198

-0.403
-3 .127***
-0.889
-0.624
-0.323
-2.166**
-1.204
0 .149
-2.504**
-2.420**
-1.072
-0.240
0 .159
0 .775
-1,808*
0. 376
0. 040
0 .868
1. 314
0 .657

0.328
0. 345
-1.173
-1.838*®
-1.216
-1.399
-2.675***
-0.586
-2.621***
-1.342
-2.209**
0.720
0.144
-0.759
-1 .721*
-0.390
0. 127
0. 2 1 2

A--Significant level; *-*0.10; **--0.05; ***--0,01. B--A11 tests
are two-tail test except on day -1 and 0 which is one-tail test.
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period, especially if the information were bad news.

The DV

model also predicts the reduction of price activity during
the announcement period.
the Z-statistic

During the announcement period,

(see Table 4.7C)

on day -1 and day -3.

shows significant results

The Wilcoxon test shows significant

results on day -3 but insignificant results on day -1.
In the pre-announcement period,

the Z-statistic shows

significant increases in U-statistics on eight days.

The

Wilcoxon test does not support any of those results.
Likewise,

in the post-announcement period,

the Z-statistic

also shows significant increase in U-statistics on several
days but none of those days'
Wilcoxon test.

increases are supported by the

In conclusion,

the statistical evidence only

moderately support options listing impact on the NEG group.

Positive Unexpected Earnings Group

fPOSl

Figure 4.3A of the POS group shows that, unlike the NEG
group, there is a general decrease in U-statistic during all
three periods of the AO year.

During the announcement

period, the Z-statistic shows significant decrease in Ustatistic on day 0 (see Table 4.7 A ) .

The Wilcoxon test

shows significant results only on day 0 .
In the pre-announcement period, both the Z-statistic
and the wilcoxon test show significant results only on days
-12 and -18.

In the post-announcement period, the Z-

statistic shows significant results on day +2, + 6 , +9, and
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+10.
+11

But the Wilcoxon test shows significant results on day
only.
In conclusion,

the statistical tests showed shows

moderate options listing impact on the' POS group.
following section statistically tests the
earnings'

The

'unexpected

hypothesis to see if the impact of options listing

is statistically stronger on the NEG group than on the POS
group.

The

1U n e x p e c t e d E a r n i n g s 1 H y p o t h e s i s

Table 4.7D presents the statistical results from the
test on the

'unexpected earnings' hypothesis.

Table 4.4C of the

'size' hypothesis,

Similar to

the figure on the left

hand column represents the change in the U-statistic
that group.

(CU) in

The sign of the CU represents the direction of

the change in U-statistic.

During the announcement period,

these two groups of firms have the same sign from day -3 to
— 1.

This indicates that the U-statistic for both groups of

firms has decreased during these three days in the AO year.
Despite the data showing that the decrease in the Ustatistic for the NEG group is much greater than that of the
POS group on day -1, the Z-statistic does not show highly
significant changes on any of the three days.

Since this is

not a match group design, there is no appropriate
nonparametric test parallel to the Z-statistic.

On day 0,
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the two groups have opposite signs on C U , indicating that
options listing have an opposite impact on these two groups.
During the pre- and post-announcement period,
groups have opposite signs on most of the days.

these two

In that

case, the significant results of the Z-statistic merely
means that the options listing impact on these two groups
are different, but it carries no implication as to whether
the impact is stronger on one group or another.
In conclusion, despite the data showing that the impact
of options listing has a stronger impact on the NEG group
than on the POS group during the earnings announcement
period, the statistical results do not strongly support the
'unexpected earnings' hypothesis.

In addition, options

listing seems to have an opposite impact on these two groups
during the pre-announcement and the post-announcement period
making it difficult to test for the differential options
1 isting effects on these two groups.

One plausible explanation for the insignificant results
is that the sample size of the unexpected earnings groups
are too small.

For example,

the sample size of the positive

group is thirty-two in the BO year and seventeen in the AO
year.

The small sample makes it more difficult to reject

the null hypothesis.

Of course, the other plausible

explanation is that the 'unexpected earnings' effect is not
as strong as Diamond and Verrechia

[1987] suggested.
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4.2.4 OTC Firms
Since there are only twenty-three OTC firms which have
forecast data in the value line,

it is not feasible to

divide the firms into unexpected earnings groups to test for
the

'unexpected earnings' hypothesis as with the exchange

firms.

Instead,

statistical analysis of the OTC firms can

only be performed on the aggregate level.

Thirty-six firms

have sufficient data to perform the aggregate level analysis
(Note: analysis at the aggregate level does not require the
forecast data in value line).
Table 4.8 provides the statistical analysis to test the
hypothesis that options listing significantly reduces the Ustatistics of the OTC firms.
i

U o T C .B O .t ,

*

^ O T C .A O .t

^

=

—1

° r

®

Figure 4.4 shows that the distribution of U-statistic
of the OTC firms is not as smooth as that of the exchange
firms

(see Figure 4.1).

explanations:

There are two plausible

1) the sample size of the OTC firms (36)

is

much smaller than the sample size of the exchange firms
(170); and 2) the OTC firms are riskier than the exchange
firms.

Despite the differences in fluctuation,

the

distribution pattern of the U-statistic between these two
groups is very similar.

They both show that there is a

general increase in U-statistic in the pre-announcement
period, and a general decrease in U-statistic during the

Tab la 4.8
Comparison of Avarags U-statistio of All
OTC Firms Bsfora and Aftsr options Listing
DAY
-20

-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
-12
- 11
- 10

-9
-8

-7
-6

-5
-4
-3
-2

-1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+ 10
+ 11
+ 12
+ 13
+ 14
+ 15
+ 16
+ 17
+ 18
+ 19
+ 20

Average U-statistic
-------------------(BO)
(AO)
1. 545
2 .170
2 .00 1
0 .916
1.314
1. 780
1. 509
0.946
1. 064
1. 209
1 .108
1.317
0.970
1. 015
1.273
1. 804

1. 235
1.305
1. 152
0. 667
0.928
0 .680
0. 949
0. 962
1.750
1.026

Z-statisticB

Wilcoxontest

1. 385
0.926
1. 759
1. 965
1. 178

0. 920
2.560**A
2.510**
0. 740
1. 140
3.250***
1.650*
-0.050
-2.030**
0. 540
0 .260
-0 . 2 0 0
0. 130
- 2 .2 0 0 **
-2.040**
1.850*

0.282
1. 059
0 .957
0 .630
1. 487
0.879
1. 064
1. 036
-0.292
0. 563
1. 565
1. 278
-1.358
-0.946
-0.946
1. 245

1. 197
2.470
2 .014
2.364
1.062

1 .293
1. 094
1. 291
1.703
2 .395

-0.290
4.060***
2.140**
1.950*
-3.940***

0 .794
1. 053
1. 143
1.487*
-2.326**

1.521
1.413
0 .812
0.535
1. 153
1 .108
0. 902
1 .126
1. 371
0.840
0.714
1 .329
0 .770
0.801
0.887
1 .228
1 .680
1. 389
0.644
1 .134

0 .824
1 .157
0.492
1.240
0. 683
0. 655
0. 954
2 .264
1. 123
0.753
1 .161
1 .008
1 .028
1. 405
1.734
1.480
1.077

2.060**
0. 760
0.950
-2.080**
1. 390
1.340
-0.150
-3 .360***
0 .730
0 .260
-1.320
0.950
-0.760
-1.790
-2.500**
-0.740
1.780*
0. 520
-4.230***
1. 360

0 .692
1. 064
1. 105
-1.510
0.276
0.997
0 .585
-0.766
0 .129
0 .033
-0.366
-0.203
-0.856
-0.963
-1.419
-1 .442
0 .839
-0.681
-1.656*
0.974

1. 021

1.211

2 .075
0. 675

A--Signifleant level: *--0.10; **--0.05; ***--0.01. B--A11 tests
are two-tall test except on day -1 and 0 which is one-tail test.
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Figure 4.4
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announcement period.

During the announcement period, the Z-

statistic shows that the

U-statistic has decreased

significantly on day -1,

-2, and -3.

The Wilcoxon test

only

shows significant results on day - 1 .
Both the Z-statistic and the Wilcoxon test show a
significant increase in the u-statistic on day o which
appears to be contradictory to the options listing
hypothesis.

However,

Figure 4.4 shows that the increase in

U-statistic on day 0 is followed by a sharp decrease in
reaction on the following three days.

In fact, the Z-

statistic shows significant decrease in U-statistic on day
+1.

Therefore, a plausible explanation is that, after

options listing,

the security markets speed up the

adjustments to earnings announcements.

Consequently, the

price reaction incurs in one to two days instead of four to
five days--which explains why the U-statistic actually
increases instead of decreases on day 0.

If this is the

case, then the OTC firms

are more efficiently priced,and

the result is consistent

with the options listing

hypothesi s .
A brief look at the Z-statistic in the pre-announcement
period shows that the U-statistic increases on day -6 and
day -7, but the results are not supported by the Wilcoxon
test.

Other than that, there seems to be mixed reaction

during the pre-announcement and post-announcement periods.
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And on most days, the results are not supported by the
Wilcoxon test.

In other

words, the statistical results do not show any clear pattern
of impact in either the pre-announcement or post
announcement periods.
In conclusion,

the statistical results on day -1

support the hypothesis that options listing reduces the
information-content of the annual earnings announcements of
the OTC firms.

However,

there is one major concern in

testing the options listing effect on the OTC firms is small
sample size.

When sample size is too smal1, the results are

more easily dominated by outliers and consequently more
difficult to interpret.

In addition, the small sample size

also affects the validity of statistical testing.
instance,

For

the Z-statistic is based on the central limit

theorem, which can only apply when the size of the sample is
fairly large.

Therefore,

in order to obtain more conclusive

results of options listing effects on the OTC firms,
studies are needed when more data are available.

further

CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter reviews the empirical results of the
statistical testing.
considered.

Lastly,

The limitations of the study are
several suggestions are offered for

future research.

5.1 Review and Interpretation of Empirical Results
The following
hypotheses testing

sections summarize and review the
results in chapter 4.

Statistical Results of All Exchange Firms Hypothesis
The first set

of empirical results is based on the

hypothesis that options listing would reduce the
information- content of annual earnings announcements of the
exchange firms.

A total of 170 firms that have options

which were newly listed between 1980 and 1986 is included in
the sample.

These firms are quite evenly spread across the

five options exchanges except the NYSE, which did not list
options until 1985.
Both the parametric Z-statistic and the nonparametric
Wilcoxon test show that after options listing,

the U-

statistics of the exchange firms decrease significantly
during the annual earnings announcement.

The options

listing effect is strongest on the day before the WSJ
earnings announcement day

(commonly known as the Broad tape
91
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day).

The results are not surprising since both prior

studies found that the Broad tape day, not the WSJ earnings
announcement day, has the most price activity.
In addition,

there is a significant increase in U-

statistic on several days during the pre-announcement
period.

The results suggest that after options listing,

the

information related to the earnings announcements impound
into the market as many as 17 days earlier.

The results are

consistent with theories which suggest that markets are more
informationally efficient for options firms
Rendleman [1982] and Diamond and Verrechia
Moreover,

(Manaster and
[1987]).

in the before options listing year, there

exists a post-earnings announcement drift that lasts for
about ten days.

The drift suggests that markets continue to

adjust to the earnings information for a period of time
instead of reflecting the information immediately.

However,

the post-earnings announcement drift disappears in the year
after options listing.
drift;

It is not clear what causes the

it is equally unclear why the drift vanishes after

options listing.

The Statistical Results of the 1Bi ze1 Effect Hypothesis
The second hypothesis is concerned with whether options
listing has a stronger impact on the information-content of
small firms than large firms.

It is generally believed that

small firms are less informationally efficient than large
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firms, because they have fewer analysts to track their
activities.

In this study, the average market value of the

large group is about five times greater than the small
group.

The average beta of the large firms is about 1.20,

while the average beta of the small firms is about 1.60.
Large Firms -- the individual analysis of the large
firms shows moderate options listing effects on the earnings
announcement period.

In the pre-announcement period,

the

results indicate that, after options listing, the
information related to the earnings announcement affected
the market as many as 17 days before opt ions 1 isting occurs.
During the post-announcement period of the BO year, the
drift is very apparent in the large firms but not in the
small firms.

This phenomenon is contradictory to the claim

that drift is the result of market inefficiency, because
large firms generally are more efficient than small firms.
Again,

the drift seems to disappear in the AO year.

The

statistical tests show moderately significant results on
several d a y s .
Small Firms —

compared to the large firms, the

statistical results of the small firms on the earnings
announcement day are stronger.

The statistical tests show

highly significant results on the day before the earnings
announcement.

However, the small firms do not show a clear

pattern of price behavior in
post-announcement period.

either the pre-announcement or
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'Size* Hypothesis -- the statistical tests on the
'size' hypothesis show that options listing does have a
moderately stronger impact on small firms than on large
firms during the earnings announcement period particularly
on the day before the earnings announcement.
pre- and post-announcement periods,

however,

During the
the direction

of the changes in U-statistic between the two groups is
different most of the time, which makes it impossible to
assess the di f ferent ial opt ions 1 ist ing impact on these two
groups of firms.

Statistical Results of U n e x p e c t e d Earnings1 Hypothesis
The third section of the statistical analysis examines
the hypothesis that options listing has a stronger impact on
the information-content of firms that have negative
unexpected earnings than firms that have positive unexpected
earnings.

The exchange firms are divided into three

unexpected earnings groups:

negative, neutral, and positive.

The results show that the U-statistic in the neutral group
fluctuates less than in either the negative group or the
positive group.

The findings are consistent with the

results of prior studies which correlate unexpected earnings
with unexpected returns.
Neutral Group —

the neutral group has an unexpectedly

high U-statistic (2.856) on day -1 of the BO year.

The

statistical tests show a significant options listing effect
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on day -1.

Significant results are found during the pre-

announcement but not during the post-announcement periods.
Negative Group -- the statistical tests show mildly
significant result on day -1 during the announcement period.
In the pre-announcement period,

the statistical results find

that the U-statistic has significantly increased on several
days.

Likewise,

the statistical results also find

significant increase in U-statistic in the post-announcement
period.
Positive Group -- the positive group has a moderately
significant decrease in U-statistic on day n of the AO year.
During the pre-announcement and post announcement periods,
however, there is no strong indication of any options
1 ist ing effects.

'Unexpected Earnings' Hypothesis -- after the negative
and the positive groups were individually analyzed,

the two

groups were tested to see if the decrease in U-statistic
during the announcement days was greater in the negative
group than in the positive group.

Despite the data showing

that the decrease in U-statistic for the negative group was
greater than for the positive group on day - 1 , the
statistical result was not highly significant.
words,

In other

the finding is consistent but does not statistically

support the hypothesis.
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All OTC Firms
Finally,

a group of OTC firms are tested for the

options 1 isting effects.

The fact that OTC firms only have

options listed since 1985 make the sample much smaller than
the exchange firms.

The average market value of the OTC

firms is about 50 percent of the exchange firms.
average beta, on the other hand,
small

The

is much greater for the

firms than when compared to the exchange firms.
The small sample size makes it infeasible to test for

the unexpected earnings effects.

Instead,

studied only at the overall level.

the OTC firms are

The U-statistics of the

OTC firms fluctuate more drastically than the exchange
firms.

However,

the distribution pattern of the U-

statistics is quite similar to the exchange firms.

There is

an observed increase in U-statistics in the pre-announcement
period and a decrease in U-statistics in the announcement
pe r i o d .
During the announcement period,

the statistical results

moderately support the options listing effect on day -1.

On

the other hand, there is an increase in U-statistics on day
0 in the AO year which is inconsistent with the predicted
options 1isting effects.
day 0, however,

The increase in U-statistics on

is followed by a sharp decrease in U-

statistic over the following three days.

The increase in U-

statistic on day 0 may be caused by a faster adjustment
process.
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In the pre-announcement period, there is moderately
significant increase in U-statistic on day -6 and -7. In
addition, mixed results in both the pre-announcement and
post-announcement periods are most likely caused by the
small sample size.
Despite some problems caused by the small OTC sample,
the statistical results appear to moderately support the
options listing effect.
results,

In order to obtain more conclusive

further studies are needed when more data are

available.

CONCLUSIONS
Overall,

there are strong evidences support the notion

that options listing reduce the information-content of
annual earnings announcement of both the exchange firms and
the OTC firms.

In addition,

the results also show that the

impact of options listing is stronger on the small firms
than the large firms.

Options listing has reduced the gap

between the large firms and small firms as far as the price
reaction during the earnings annoucement is concerned.
On the other hand,

the results do not support the

’unexpected earnings’ hypothesis.

The results do not show

that the options listing impact is stronger on the small
firms than large firms.

As mentioned in chapter 4, one

plausible explanation is that the sample size of the
unexpected earnings group in this study is too small.
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All in all, the results are in line with the thoeries
of options listing.

Across four different designs, the

results show that the price reactions during annual earnings
announcement have reduced once firms have options listed.

5.2 Limitations
This study has several limitations.

First, one major

assumption of this study is that options listing is
equivalent to options trading.

In other words,

assumes that once a firm has listed its options,

this study
investors

would start to trade them, which in turn would cause more
information to be processed and to be impounded into the
market at an earlier date than without options listing.

As

a result, the information-content of annual earnings
announcements would be reduced after options listing.

The

assumption would not present a major problem if the sample
size were fairly large, because most options- 1 isted firms
are quite heavily traded.
Second,

the sample of the OTC firms is small and this

makes it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis,
especially for nonparametric tists.

Moreover, a small

sample makes the data less stable and more easily dominated
by outliers.
Finally,

about half of the exchange firms and OTC firms

did not have complete data.

Consequently, the results are

biased toward firms that have complete data.

Firms with
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complete data are usually large, well-known,

and actively

traded; as a result, the options listing effects may be less
strong on these firms.

5.3 Suggestions for Future Research
Many studies look into the stock trading volume of
stocks as a parallel to the stock returns studies.

One

extension of this study would be to use the stock volume
instead of stock returns to see if similar results can be
observed with trading volume.

The findings in the stock

volume research might produce a more extensive understanding
of the opt ions list ing e f fect.
Second, future research may also use the options price
and volume information available in the Berkeley tape.

A

study may match the price and trading volume activities of
the options to see if they conform with stock price and
volume activities.

If the two are matched,

then it is

likely that the increase in price reaction of stocks in the
pre-earnings announcement period is caused by the options
trading.
Finally,

because the sample size of the OTC firms in

this study was small,
listing effects.

it limited the analysis of the options

Further research should be done when more

data are available in the future,
conclusive results.

in order to obtain more
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